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COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY: THE EMERGING FEDERAL RESPONSE
BARRY B. BOYER*
INTRODUCrIONO nly a few years ago, the issue of "computers and the right to
privacy" was regarded as more appropriate for sensationalized
speculation in the mass media than for serious analysis and policy de-
bate. Events, however, have shown that intimate personal informa-
tion, in a variety of uses and misuses, can powerfully affect the po-
litical fabric of society as well as the lives of individuals. Disclosure
of governmental abuses such as the attempt to steal the records of Dr.
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist,' the admission that political "enemies
lists" had been compiled to single out individuals for government
harassment or disfavor,2 and repeated allegations that military and law
enforcement agencies have constructed massive surveillance dossiers
on citizens engaged in political activity,3 have all contributed to a
growing realization that erosion of personal privacy can easily threaten
freedom and the exercise of fundamental political rights.
While the computer was only a minor accessory to these highly
publicized abuses-at most, a sophisticated filing cabinet-the sur-
veillance-and-harassment incidents do serve to illustrate a more basic
problem in contemporary organizations: the individual's loss of con-
trol over personal information that affects his life, as secret decisions
are made by unaccountable decision-makers on the basis of wrong or
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo; J.D., Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1969. Portions of the research for this article were supported by a
grant from the Christopher Baldy Fund, State University of New York at Buffalo. In ad-
dition, I am indebted to Prof. Arthur R. Miller of the Harvard Law School, Prof. Mary
Kay Kane of the State University of New York at Buffalo, Ms. Margaret Gilhooley of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, and the members of the Joint Task
Group of the Medical Society of the County of Erie, New York, for their assistance in
making thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article and providing relevant
materials.
1.S ee, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 28, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 27, 1973, at 49, cols. 1-2; N.Y. Times, June 28,
1973, at 1, col. 5.
3. See, e.g., C. PETERS & T. BRANCH, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: DISSENT IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 43-76 (paper ed. 1972) (army surveillance of civilian political activ-
ity); The Washington Post, Jan. 19, 1975, at A-I, col. 7 (FBI collection of dossiers on
members of Congress); The Washington Post, Dec. 24, 1974, at A-I, col. 7 (allegations
of CIA surveillance of domestic political activity).
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irrelevant or improperly gathered personal data. In this general trend,
the computer is a key element. Increasingly complex institutional
functions and relationships in public welfare and law enforcement
programs and in private commercial dealings generate demands for
correspondingly complex information systems. Computer technology
meets this need by making it cheaper and more convenient for organi-
zations to store, retrieve, analyze, transfer, and lift out of context great
quantities of personal information. In the process, it may also threaten
the congeries of interests encompassed in the phrase, "the right to
privacy."4
The difficulties of trying to assess the computer's threats to per-
sonal privacy, and of trying to devise remedies for these perceived risks,
are clearly demonstrated in the health care professions. Within the
past decade, both the practice and the financing of medicine have
changed markedly, and change seems likely to continue in the near
future. As will be seen in the following section, computerization has
been prominently involved in many recent developments in health
care, including standardization and automation of clinical records,
biomedical and social research, and, most dramatically, in the prolifera-
tion of "third-party payment" mechanisms to spread the cost of health
care. Each of these areas poses different privacy questions, involving
different tradeoffs between the privacy interests of the individual data
4. E.g., Miller, The Right of Privacy: Data Banks and Dossiers, in PuvAoY iN A
FREE SociETY (Final Report of the Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy
in the United States) 72, 83 (1974):
The very real benefits conferred by information technology may opiate our
awareness of the price that may be exacted in terms of personal freedom. It
thus seems desirable to ... arouse a greater awareness of the possibility that
the computer is precipitating a realignment in the patterns of societal power
and is becoming an increasingly important decision-making tool in practically
all of our significant governmental and nongovernmental institutions. As society
becomes more and more information oriented, the central issue that emerges
to challenge us is how to contain the excesses and channel the benefits of this
new form of power.
However, Professors Baker and Westin, after studying a variety of computer systems
handling personal information, reported:
In a majority of the organizations we visited, our clear finding is that the
content of computerized records about individuals has not been increased in
scope compared to what was collected in their manual counterparts during the
precomputer era. The explanation for this lies in a combination of two factors
-managerial intentions and the state of the computer art during the past
15 years.
A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATA BANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 244 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as WEsTIN & BAxER]. They also concluded that information which is considered most
sensitive in an organization tends not to be computerized. Id. at 249. They also concluded
that precomputer rules and practices tend to persist after an information system is com-
puterized. Id. at 253.
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subject and the social or organizational interest in the free flow of
patient records. Medical data poses this efficiency-privacy dilemma in
a particularly acute form: for the great majority of people, records of
physical or mental illness are the most sensitive kinds of personal
information that will ever be systematically collected, yet widespread
access to medical records is vitally important in treatment, in research,
in the formation of public policy, and in compensating the victim of
accident or disease.
The spread of computers into various specialized fields of medical
record-keeping also raises questions about the ability of the legal sys-
tem to control a technology which tends to ignore geographical and
jurisdictional boundaries, blurs the distinction between the public
and private sectors, and insulates decisions behind a layer of technical
obscurity. The traditional legal doctrines applicable to medical privacy,
the physician-patient privilege and the common law right to privacy,
are largely irrelevant to questions that arise in automated medical
data systems. In place of the old doctrines, new general principles
are becoming widely accepted as the basis for protecting informa-
tional privacy: there must be no secret data systems; the individual
must be able to find out what information about him is recorded, must
consent to uses beyond the original purposes for which the data was
collected, and must be able to correct erroneous information in his
file; and the data collecting organization must assure the reliability of
personal data and prevent misuse of it.5 However, as these principles
are adopted and elaborated in legislation like the federal Privacy Act
of 1974,6 it is becoming apparent that the effectiveness and costs of
implementing these goals in particular fields such as medical record-
keeping remain highly debatable. At most, the recent legislative ac-
tivity is only a first, cautious step in the search for a workable system
of controls for the uses and abuses of sensitive personal data.
I. MEDICAL RECOpDS AND REcoRD-KEEPERS
The spread of the computer into medical record-keeping is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon, and one that has been poorly documented.
Thus, generalizations about the computer's impact on medicine are
5. See HEW, RECORDS, COIfPUTERS AND THF, RIGHTS OF CITIZENS xx-xm1
(Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems,
U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, July, 1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW
RzPORT].
6. See text accompanying notes 232-308 infra.
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hazardous. Nevertheless, a few examples of automated data systems
that have been developed or planned in the health care field can illu-
minate the institutional relationships and imperatives that give rise to
computerization of medical records, and the information-handling
practices that may pose threats to individual privacy.
In general, medical data systems can be divided into three cate-
gories: those that are used in direct support of clinical care; those that
are devoted to statistical research and policy planning applications;
and those that are employed in the process of providing payment for
medical treatment. While these functions are often combined in a
single information system, each kind of record-keeping poses sufficiently
distinct problems to warrant separate consideration.
A. Computers in Clinical Medicine
As the practice of medicine has changed in recent decades, the
medical record has become an increasingly important determinant of
the quality of health care. A major force affecting the character and
use of clinical records has been the "knowledge explosion" in biomed-
ical research, the proliferation of general information relevant to the
treatment of a particular illness. Some observers have estimated that
the average rate at which new information is being compiled through-
out medicine is about 5 percent compounded annually,7 and in some
areas of intensive research the growth rate has been much higher.8 If
this estimate is accurate, the amount of "total clinical knowledge"
relevant to medical treatment is now more than eight times larger
than it was in 1980.9
Medicine has responded to the proliferation of knowledge in part
by lengthening the education of doctors. However, this strategy has
met obvious limitations of time, cost, and effectiveness: already, some
commentators have observed, we have reached the point at which
"much of the information [a medical student] acquires is obsolete
7. 1 JOINT TASK GROUP OF THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE COUNTY OF BRIE,
MEDICAL PRIVACY AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 70 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL
PRIVACY AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY].
8. E.g., id.:
If we take the state-of-the-art of 1930 as a fixed point of comparison, by 1972,
our factual knowledge on sickle cell disease has increased 18.2 times. Similar
studies in opthalmology (retina detachment), cardiology (subacute bacterial
endocarditis), neurology (cord bladder), and hepatology (viral hepatitis)
showed similar spectacular growth figures, ranging from 6 to 20 times more
specific information today, when compared to the 1930 level of information.
9. See id. at 71.
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before he completes his residency."' 10 Instead, the dominant strategy
of the profession has been to fragment the practice of medicine into
increasingly narrow specialties and subspecialties, so that the amount
of data to be mastered by the physician could be kept within reason-
able bounds. But the increasing specialization among physicians means
that the individual patient must seek treatment from a wide variety of
experts, and often a single episode of illness will require the skills of
several different types of medical specialists. As each of these specialists
begins treatment, he must bring together relevant information about
past treatment and present condition: such record linkage "often in-
creases the meaning of current observations by placing them in time
context,"" or warns the treating physician of potentially dangerous
situations such as drug sensitivities.
The actual records that are needed for diagnosis and treatment
will likely be scattered about in different doctors' offices, clinics, labora-
tories, and hospitals, and often can be obtained only with great diffi-
culty or delay. Indeed, given the extreme mobility of the American
people,'2 the records may well be located in different states or foreign
countries. Usually, the patient himself is required to perform the neces-
sary record-keeping. The results of using the patient to perform the
record-linking function are frequently dismal, since he may never have
received sufficiently detailed information about his owft condition in
the course of previous treatment.' 3 Even if he did receive the relevant
data, it may have become badly distorted in his memory:
The diagnostician is often frustrated by the "soft" data and notori-
ously inaccurate presentation of past medical history. Many patients
can recall the post-operative discomfort, the cold food, or the friendli-
ness of a nurse better than the exact reason for or the nature of the
surgery performed. Many patients offer a vivid description of the
color, size, or taste of their medication, but cannot recall the name
and/or dosage of the drug. Besides the notoriously poor quality of his-
toric information presented by many patients, sometimes it is not
10. Austen & Kinney, The Content of Undergraduate Medical Education, in THE
FUTURE OF MEDICAL EDUCATION 71, 73 (J. Graves ed. 1973).
11. Id. at 67.
12. Recent statistics indicate that the average American moves his residence about
14 times in his lifetime; each year some 40 million Americans change their addresses at
least once, and more than a third of these move across county or state lines. V. PACxARD,
A NATION OF STRANGERS 6-7 (1972).
13. For a discussion of patients' difficulties in getting access to their own records,
see Kaiser, Patients' Right of Access to Their Own Medical Records: The Need for New
Law, 24 BUFFALO L. Rav. 317 (1975).
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good medical judgment to burden the patient with his own diag-
nosis, treatment, or prognosis.14
Computer-communications systems are an attractive alternative
to the inefficiencies of existing methods for linking and retrieving dis-
persed patient records. With existing technology, 5 the individual's
medical history can be uniformly documented, centrally stored in
machine-readable form, quickly accessed, and transmitted nationally
or even internationally in seconds via telecommunications channels.'0
Automated data processing systems can also be delegated responsibility
for performing a variety of routine hospital and office chores, with po-
tentially lower costs and greater reliability than their human counter-
parts. Clinical computing systems have been developed or proposed to
verify prescriptions against average dosage levels, continuously moni-
tor the patient's condition, remind nurses of medication schedules and
check their compliance,17 and scan large numbers of patient files to
identify individuals who may be unusually vulnerable to impending
illness.' 8 Finally, a different kind of clinical computing system can help
14. MEDICAL PRIVACY AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 68. The patient's difficulty in
communicating relevant information about his past medical history may be complicated
by the record-proliferation that is said to result from "practicing defensive medicine." It
has been asserted that fear of malpractice liability induces some physicians to perform
more diagnostic tests and procedures than they believe necessary, and to document treat-
ment with great thoroughness, in the belief that these steps can help to avoid or minimize
malpractice claims. See generally Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, in Appendix to REPORT
TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 38 (U.S. Dept. of Health,
Education and Welfare, 1973).
15. For a brief summary of the relevant aspects of computer technology, see Miller,
Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an In-
formation-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1093-1103 (1969).
16. The capability has been present for some time; for example, in 1967, "a com-'
puter in Washington, D.C., analyzed electrocardiograms of patients in France and re-
turned interpretations within thirty seconds." Freed, Legal Aspects of Computer Use in
Medicine, in MEDICAL PROGRESS AND THE LAW 114 (C. Havighurst ed. 1969). See also
Irwin, Washington-Moscow Medical Hotline, The Buffalo Courier-Express, March 31,
1974 (Parade Magazine), at 16; Freed, A Legal Structure for a National Medical Data
Center, 49 B.U.L. RaV. 79 (1969).
17. See generally Freed, Legal Aspects of Computer Use in Medicine, supra note
16, at 131, 140.
18. Examples of this capability in a prepaid group health plan serving 20,000 mem-
bers are provided in Grossman, Barnett, Keopsell, Nesson, Dorsey & Phillips, An Auto-
mated Medical Record System, 224 J.A.M.A. 1616, 1620 (1973) which states:
Information can be selected from the computer files concerning any set of
patients whose records meet defined criteria. [One such study produced] a list
of women whom the physicians wished to contact because they were taking a
particular type of sequential birth control pill that had been removed from the
market by the Food and Drug Administration. Other special studies included
a profile of the welfare-supported population of the plan, and a mailing list of




the treating physician keep current with developing knowledge in his
field by providing him with an "external memory" capable of in-
stantly recalling massive bodies of data.19
Notwithstanding these many perceived advantages of clinical com-
puting systems, the development of automated patient records has ap-
parently been neither rapid nor extensive.20 When computers have been
used in hospitals and clinics, they have most frequently been em-
ployed for routine administrative chores such as admissions, billing or
scheduling rather than as part of the treatment process. Several reasons
for this reluctance to computerize patient records have been suggested.
The number of physicians and related health care professionals who
are sufficiently familiar with modern data processing systems to fore-
see their benefits or feel comfortable in using them is probably small;
thus, full acceptance of the technology may have to await broad edu-
cation or re-education of the medical profession. Moreover, medical
records and charts have proven difficult to reduce to machine-readable
form at acceptable costs because of the great variety of information
that must be stored and retrieved and the lack of generally accepted
standard recording formats.21 Many physicians also may fear that com-
puterization will cause them to lose control over the use and dissemina-
tion of their patients' medical records, which they are ethically obliged
to keep confidential.
19. See, e.g., MEDICAL PRIVACY AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 75 (emphasis re-
moved) which reads:
Substantial extension of our memory could be accomplished if biomedical
knowledge could be deposited in a data bank, in a highly organized fashion,
and the clinician could use the external memory in addition to his stored med-
ical knowledge. For instance, if all the less frequent diseases, all the drugs with
their indications, risks, and metabolic characteristics could be stored in an
easily retrievable fashion, the clinical choice of drugs could be a comparison of
clinical data on hand with retrieved information from the biomedical knowl-
edge bank.... Such an artificial intelligence support could close the gap between
existing knowledge and bedside medicine.
20. See, e.g., WESTIN & BAKER, supra note 4, at 204, stating:
For the most part, the medical community has not yet turned heavily to
computerization to solve its medical record-keeping problems. A 1970 survey
of hospitals in the U.S. reports that "55 percent of all hospital information
processing applications are still performed by hand," and in our national survey
only 24 percent of the hospitals in the sample reported computer applications
to their patient medical records.
21. Cf. WESTIN & BAKER at 204, that reads, "Because the patient's individual med-
ical record is a basically narrative document, it is difficult to reduce it to the kinds of
codes and abbreviations which might make computer storage relatively inexpensive; in-
stead, massive storage would be required for any system that was designed to accept the
record in narrative form." However, despite the fact that "narrative materials make up
much more of the psychiatric patient record than of the average medical or surgical
case history," psychiatric records have been successfully computerized. Curran, Laska,
Kaplan & Bank, Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality, 182 SCIENCE 797 (1973).
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Despite the difficulties of computerizing clinical records, some
large-scale projects are already being planned. In Massachusetts, a sub-
sidiary of Blue Shield is reportedly developing a computer service
called "Blue Streak" which will expand from a simple billing service
"to include an automated medical record, tailored [to] the physician's
practice, as well as an emergency medical data base ... for emergency
hospital room use."122 In addition to providing direct links from the
hospital emergency room to the patient data base,23 Blue Streak will
make it possible for the diagnosing physician who refers a patient to a
specialist to allow the specialist direct access to portions of the patient's
computerized file.24
Development of a computer system that would be similar in func-
tion, but considerably different in organization, has been considered
by a multidisciplinary group in Western New York. Instead of a
commercial venture, the New York data bank would be an "ethical
health data center" subject to a variety of constraints to safeguard the
privacy and integrity of patient records.25 The ethical data center would
be a "dedicated system" used exclusively for processing patient rec-
ords, and structured as a nonprofit corporation or similarly autonomous
entity. However, it would also be subject to privacy safeguards re-
sulting from the ethical constraints of the health care professions,
oversight by public or quasi-public authorities, and operational guide-
lines formulated with consumer participation.
A third approach to linking multiple health care providers through
computer-communications systems is the Kaiser-Permanente group
medical plan described by Professors Westin and Baker.20 One of the
largest and most successful plans providing both insurance and health
22. MASSACHUSETTS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA,
HEALTH AND PRIVACY: PATIENT REcORDs 57 (1974). The data available to emergency
care providers will not encompass the patient's entire file, but rather will consist of
limited items organized into an "emergency medical bank" consisting of blood type, trans-
plant information, and the like. Id. at 61.
23.
Emergency record files will be stored by patient, number and accessible to
'qualified emergency providers'-namely, hospitals. At the present time, Blue
Streak envisions terminals in hospital emergency rooms ....
Id. at 61.
24. Apparently input from physicians would be segregated into a "working file"
and a "confidential file," with only the former accessible to a physician who subsequently
treats the patient. See id. at 59-61.
25. See generally Computers in Clinical Medicine; Cosgriff, The Joint Task Force
on Computers in Medical Practice of the Medical Society of the County of Erie, 4 [.
CLINICAL COMPUTING 6 (1974).
26. See WESTIN & BAKER at 205-14.
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care,2 7 Kaiser-Permanente has pioneered computerization of clinical
records with the objective of developing a data system "that will sup-
port the medical data requirements of one million health plan mem-
bers, one thousand physicians, and a large corps of professional and
paramedical contributors to patient care." 28 Since a prepaid plan of
this nature attempts to meet all the health care needs of its members,
and emphasizes frequent check-ups and preventive care, the amount of
data that might be generated by a large-scale data network is potentially
enormous. However, the computer system has apparently not yet de-
veloped beyond a pilot project confined to the San Francisco area.29
While there may be some question as to whether any of these ap-
proaches to the computerization of clinical records is technically and
economically feasible at the present time,30 the current level of in-
terest and experimentation suggests that large-scale computerization of
primary clinical records will eventually come about. If this does occur,
these computing systems may threaten individual privacy for several
reasons. First, a data center which attempts to meet a variety of pa-
tient needs on a continuing basis will in all likelihood have to be
quite comprehensive. At the time patient records enter the system in
the process of treatment or a routine check-up, it may well be impossi-
ble to determine whether a particular item of data can provide a cru-
cial clue to the diagnosis or cure of a future illness, and consequently
the natural tendency of the system operators should be to err on the
side of inclusion. It will also be difficult for system operators to estab-
lish criteria for "purging" stale or outdated records: a drug reaction or
a genetic condition, for example, may not manifest itself for decades
or even generations. Thus, the record system most useful for medical
treatment will be a complete birth-to-death history of encounters with
the health care systems, perhaps cross-referenced to relatives, co-workers
and other groups who share medically significant characteristics.
In addition to having a comprehensive data base, an efficient clin-
ical computing system will have to be quickly accessible over a wide
27. 'For a set fee, the program-which is both insurer and medical provider-
agrees to meet all of the members' health needs, from examinations and innoculations to
long-term hospital care." Id. at 206.
28. Id. at 208.
29. Id. at 209. Westin and Baker conclude: "Whether large-scale computerized
medical files can provide the kind of reliable and sophisticated service required, or
whether the costs of adopting computer systems for medical record-keeping will be too
high, are questions still to be answered." Id.
30. Development of the Kaiser-Permanente system was subsidized by a grant from
the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. WESTIN & BAKER at 208. Crea-
tion of an ethical health data center would undoubtedly require similar support, at least
to meet start-up costs.
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geographic area if it is to be useful for the treatment of acute illnesses
among a mobile populace. To assure that the relevant information will
be pronptly available in the one emergency room where the accident
victim is taken, the data will have to be constantly accessible at all of
the facilities where he might need emergency treatment. Achieving
this kind of flexibility and quick response, however, may undermine
the privacy objective of assuring that sensitive data is disclosed only
to those who have legitimate need, and proper authorization, to ob-
tain it. 31
A third set of problems that will arise from the large-scale com-
puterization of clinical records is economic and institutional pressures
to utilize the data base for purposes other than direct patient care.
Once medical records are reduced to machine readable form, it will
be relatively easy to use them in performing tasks like the biomedical
research, policy analysis, and financial accounting functions described
in the following sections.32 The ability to perform these "secondary"
data processing functions with records that are compiled for the "pri-
mary" purpose of patient care means that those who urge separation of
functions on privacy grounds-the use of "dedicated" or single-purpose
systems for clinical records-will have to bear a heavy and perhaps
insurmountable burden of cost-justification. 3 If the trend of develop-
ment is toward multiple-purpose systems in which a variety of data users
have differing needs for access to different portions of the medical
record, the task of safeguarding the data subject's privacy becomes con-
siderably more complex and problematical.
B. Systems for Health Statistics
Computerization of medical records has made possible a wide array
of statistical programs designed to improve policy decisions at all levels
31. A possible method of reducing this risk is to partition the file so that only a
limited amount of data commonly needed for emergency care (e.g., blood type, drug
sensitivities) is available to emergency care providers. This is the approach being taken
by the Blue Streak system. See notes 22-23 supra & accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 78.
Many automated personal data systems established primarily for administrative
purposes are also used for statistical reporting and research. Since one advan-
tage of computerizing administrative records is the capability thereby acquired
for high-speed data retrieval and manipulation, a growing number of adminis-
trative data systems will be put to such additional uses.
33. An official of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare has criti-
cized the "ethical health data center" concept (text accompanying note 25 supra), which
is based on the separation of clinical records in a dedicated system, on the ground that
single-purpose systems would be too costly. Crystal, Individual, Professional, and Com-
munity Concerns With the Health Data Center: Confidentiality Considerations, 4 J.
CLINICAL COMPUING 37, 41 (1974).
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from the administration of a single hospital or clinic to the restructuring
of the national health care system. The diversity of health-related sta-
tistical functions is illustrated by the Multi-State Information System
for Psychiatric Patient Records (MSIS), a single computer system serv-
ing a number of public mental health authorities throughout the coun-
try. 4 The MSIS system is designed to handle not only "individual
[patient] records that could be useful in daily clinical activities," but
also "aggregate data for administrative, fiscal, and research purposes":8 5
Accurate, timely statistics are available on the number of patients
served, the types of services rendered, the progress made, and the re-
sources utilized....
Data are also used in determining whether all segments of the
population are served adequately and equally by a mental health
facility. Statistics on ethnic group, income, age, sex, and so forth are
used for planning extensions of existing programs, for developing new
programs, and for correcting inequities.
... [Within participating institutions], data for the facility as a
whole are used for administrative and management purposes-for
example, to determine how much food or medication to order....
The system's capabilities continue to expand through the de-
velopment of data collection and analysis techniques in such areas
as patient billings, cost analysis, third-party payers, computer-sug-
gested modes of treatment, automated utilization-review procedures,
and program evaluation.3 6
Many of these statistical studies become more valuable if informa-
tion systems are sufficiently compatible to permit comparative analyses
involving different geographical areas or patient populations.37 How-
34. Curran, Laska, Kaplan & Bank, Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality, 182
SCIENCE 797, 798 (1973) describes the program:
With some $10 million in the [National Institutes of Mental Health]
demonstration grant, an effective program of cooperation in data collection and
utilization among a group of jurisdictions, some largely urban and some largely
rural, ranging from the easternmost to the westernmost state, has been estab-
lished. At this writing, the participating public mental health authorities are
those of the state governments of Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont; also participating are
the public mental health program of the District of Columbia and the psychia-
try program of the Universrity of Alabama. The MSIS program is open to addi-
tional cooperating jurisdictions and programs.
35. Id. at 797.
36. Id. at 798.
37. For example, in 1971, the President's Commission on Federal Statistics criti-
cized existing federal statistical programs in the health-care field because they were
collected on a national basis, and could not be validly broken down into units smaller
than states or large metropolitan areas for statistical purposes. Ullman, Federal Govern-
ment Involvement in Data Collection for Subnational Areas, in 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON FEDERAL STATISTICS 121, 160-62 (1971).
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ever, compatibility has been lacking because planning for health care
delivery has traditionally been decentralized, with most policy-making
performed at the state, county or local level. 8 The federal government
has recently begun to make health statistics more uniform through a
Cooperative Health Statistics System in which federal grants and con-
tracts are used to induce standardization of governmental statistics at
all levels.39 These cooperative efforts, together with the federal govern-
ment's own statistics-gathering programs, 40 could produce in the health
field the functional equivalent of the proposed National Data Center
that was abandoned in the mid-1960's because of public and congres-
sional concern about potential invasions of privacy.4
The question whether health statistics systems constitute a threat
to privacy largely depends upon whether, or to what extent, the records
being used for statistical purposes are individually identifiable. In a
number of statistical applications, it is clear that the ability to identify
particular data subjects contributes to the efficiency and utility of the
system. Some health statistics programs have a longitudinal component
38. See id. at 160.
39. See 39 FED. RaG. 1458 (1974) (functions of Division of Cooperative Health
Statistics System, National Center for Health Statistics). The objectives of the Co-
operative System are described as follows in Ullman, supra note 37, at 163:
States will be encouraged to develop strong organizations, spoken of as
State Centers for Health Statistics, with the staff and facilities to take on the
major part of the data collection and data processing for the system. The
federal government will reimburse the states for data provided in machine
readable form that meets the federal specifications, and also for a part of the
costs of operating the data collection and data processing mechanisms.
...This research and development phase will proceed on a project-by-
project basis, each project being selected to increase knowledge about how the
total system ought to be designed-and to help in the development of the
capabilities of a State Center for Health Statistics.
40. The National Center for Health Statistics in the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare has several subunits engaged in collecting and analyzing statistics,
including the following: Division of Health Interview Statistics, which "[p]lans and ad-
ministers statistical programs based on a systematic nationwide health interview survey";
Division of Vital Statistics, which "[pllans and administers statistical programs serving
demographic and public health needs of vital statistics" and "develops standards for
data collection ...as the basis for a national cooperative vital statistics system at fed-
eral, State, and local levels"; Division of Health Manpower and Facilities Statistics,
which "[p]lans and administers statistical programs based on systematic nationwide sur-
veys and inventories of health manpower and facilities"; Division of Health Resources
Utilization, which conducts statistical programs based on "a systematic collection of
data on the utilization of health resources"; and Division of Health Examination Sta-
tistics, which "[p]lans and administers statistical programs based on systematic nationwide
health examination surveys of individuals." 39 FED. REQ. 1458 (1974). See also 1 PRnSi-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON FEDERAL STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 25-26; Ulnman, supra
note 37, at 162-63.
41. For a discussion of the National Data Center proposal, and reactions to it, see
Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in
an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MAicH. L. Rav. 1091, 1129-34 (1969).
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that requires tracking the individual over a period of time, either to
follow the development of a disease,2 or to investigate responses to
different kinds of treatment, or to find out how certain classes of peo-
ple utilize health care services.43 It may also be thought desirable to
match different sets of data such as welfare, police, and psychiatric
records to see whether the same groups of individuals are making de-
mands upon different public agencies.44 However, when these kinds of
file linkages are permitted, a variety of statistical techniques are avail-
able to minimize the risk that data from different files can be aggre-
gated to compile dossiers on identifiable individuals.4 5
Apart from the possibility that statistical data will be improperly
used or released in identifiable form, threats to privacy can result from
42. E.g., Maryland Department of Mental Hygiene & National Institutes of Mental
Health, Maryland Psychiatric Case Register 20 (1967) reads:
Longitudinal studies on the natural history of mental disorders and
their outcome should be possible in a few more years. Since the Register has
collected only five years of data, the "payoff" with respect to statistics on the
progression from childhood disorders to adult disorders, chronicity and treat-
ment evaluation has not yet been fully realized.
43. See, e.g., Hearings on Federal Information Systems and Plans Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., lt Sess., pt. 2, at 228
(1973) (testimony of Robert A. Knisley, Director, Division of Community Management
Systems, Department of Housing and Urban Development).
At the National Center for Health Statistics ... data are now collected on
the number of visits made to family planning clinics across the country. NCHS
is unable to tell, however, the number of women using the clinics. Surely this
is inadequate for program planning and evaluation.
Id.
44. See, e.g., Maryland Department of Mental Hygiene & National Institute of
Mental Health, supra note 42, at 21:
Record matching studies with [the Maryland Psychiatric Case Register and]
police, welfare and other agency records, either on a sample basis or as part
of a broader psychosocial register, have not yet been carried out .... Studies
of the interrelationship of psychiatric cases with other identified cases of deviant
behavior are greatly needed. Are these the same or different populations? What
is the size of the population with recognized deviant behavior problems and
what are its demographic characteristics? What services are provided for these
problems?
45. See generally D. Campbell, R. Boruch, R. Schwartz & J. Steinberg, Confiden-
tiality-Preserving Modes of Access to Files and to Interfile Exchange for Useful Statistical
Analysis (Final Draft of Appendix A to the Final Report of the National Research Coun-
cil Committee on Federal Agency Evaluation Research, Oct. 1974). Among the tech-
niques discussed are microaggregation "to create many synthetic average persons and to
release the data on these rather than on individuals." Id. at 9. See also id. at 20.
Other techniques are "link file brokerage" in which the task of linking the files in ques-
tion, and stripping off identifiers, can be performed by a neutral third party (id. at
22-24); and "mutually insulated file linkage" in which "some types of file linkage
can be achieved without merging and in a manner that prevents either fie from acquir-
ing individual information from the other file." Id. at 4. See also id. at 24-32. The
authors emphasize that these techniques and others are not absolutely foolproof in all




questionable practices in collecting statistical information. It has been
charged that data collectors use the "leverage" inherent in an admin-
istrative system, such as welfare benefit determinations, to collect per-
sonal information needed solely for statistical purposes,4" or deliberately
foster the mistaken impression that the requested data must be pro-
vided under penalty of law,47 or give respondents assurances of confi-
dentiality that are supported neither by law nor by administrative
regulation.48 Information gatherers may also give data subjects the
46. See HEW REPORT at 79-80. The Report recommends that "when personal
data are collected for administrative purposes, individuals should under no circum-
stances be coerced into providing additional personal data that are to be used exclusively
for statistical reporting and research." Id. at 85.
47. See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMaISSION ON FEDERAL STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 205,
which reads:
Addition of [a] simple statement [that the respondent's voluntary coopera-
tion is solicited] would go far to reduce the range of possible misunderstand-
ing. That it would not completely eliminate misunderstanding is established by
the experience of statisticans in several agencies who sometimes get pleading re-
quests from recipients of mailed questionnaires to be excused from responding,
despite clear statements in the cover letter that voluntary responses are being
sought.
A study of federal agency practices relating to the handling of personally identifi-
able information which was conducted for the Administrative Conference of the United
States in 1973 concluded that "agencies do not, as a rule, give the respondent any in-
formation at the time of collection on whether the information is required by statute to
be furnished, the precise purpose for which the information is being collected, the uses
to which it will be put, or whether other governmental organizations will be given access
to the information in individually-identifiable form." The study also found that the
failure to disclose was "a calculated practice which was uniformly rationalized by the
administrators . .. as a means of obtaining more and fuller responses to demands for
information." A. Bell, Interagency Transfers of Information in Individually-Identifiable
Form 4-5 (unpublished report prepared for the Committee on Rulemaking and Public
Information of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Sept. 10, 1973).
48. 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FEDERAL STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 207
reads:
All who gather information on voluntary basis quickly learn that it is important
to promise respondents that data will be held in confidence, but it is not clear
exactly what such a promise means when it is made by an agency other than the
Bureau of the Census or the National Center for Health Statistics. Data gathered
under Title 13 of the U.S. Code, or under Section 305 of the Public Health
Service Act are not to be disclosed in such a manner that individuals can be
identified, and the data are immune from legal process.... In some cases, when
surveys are administered by researchers on contract or by agency personnel who
do not recognize some legal complexities, confidence is promised with no author-
ity whatsoever.
A graphic example of this risk is the experience of the New Jersey Negative Income Tax
Experiment, which collected a variety of sensitive personal and financial information
from low-income families under pledges of confidentiality. As a result of circumstances
which later made the program controversial, the investigators were confronted with sub-
poenas from a local prosecutor, a grand jury investigation, and congressional inquiries.
The investigators discovered that they had little or no legal protection against these
attempts to uncover personally identifiable data. See generally Kershaw & Small, Data
Confidentiality and Privacy: Lessons from the New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experi-
ment, 20 PUB. POLICY 257 (Spring, 1972).
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erroneous impression that information will be used for surveillance
rather than statistical purposes, by failing to provide respondents with
an accurate understanding of the nature of the research.4 9 Since the
right to privacy protects the mental and emotional tranquility of the
individual,50 his belief that he has lost control of sensitive personal in-
formation, or that dossiers of embarassing data are being collected about
him, can be as harmful as the reality.51
C. The Growth of Third Party Payers
Although the development of computer systems handling clinical
data or health statistics has been significant, it appears that the most
rapid and extensive computerization of medical records has taken
place in information systems which process data relating to payments
for health care services made by parties other than the individual con-
sumers of these services. A variety of institutions and organizations fall
within the category of third-party payers: government agencies, non-
profit entities like Blue Cross-Blue Shield,52 prepaid plans like Kaiser-
49. This risk was recently demonstrated by a Maryland state agency with the Or-
wellian name of the "Abortion Surveillance Unit." The agency was attacked by civil
libertarian and women's rights groups for invading the privacy of women who had had
abortions in the state. Much of the protesters' concern arose from the use of a reporting
form which required the abortion patient's address; it was feared that this information,
along with other identifiers, would permit system users to trace individuals who had had
abortions. However, the agency had been collecting this information solely for the purpose
of keying the medical data to census tract codes so that health care planners could meas-
ure trends in abortion statistics in different geographical areas. After the controversy arose,
it was a simple matter for the agency to adjust its practice to assure that identifying de-
tails were never fed into the computer, and addresses were blotted out on the reporting
forms after use. The Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1974, at C-1, col. 1.
50. Cf. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 196
(1890):
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the
refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that
solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury.
See also notes 338-40 infra, & accompanying text.
51. E.g., Miller, The Right of Privacy: Data Banks and Dossiers, in PRIVACY IN A
FRE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 74:
Unrestrained governmental recordkeeping poses a serious potential threat
to values thought basic to the philosophical fibre of our society. If a citizen
knows that his conduct and associations are "on file," and feels that there is some
possibility that the information might be used to harass or injure, he may become
more concerned about the possible content of the file and less willing to "stick
his neck out" in pursuit of constitutional rights.
See also Donner, Political Intelligence: Cameras, Informers and Files, in id. at 56.
52. For a discussion of the differences between Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and
the special regulatory treatment afforded them, see S. LAw, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT
WRONG?, 5, 7-10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. LAw).
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Permanente, 3 and commercial health and accident insurers. Together,
these third-party payers constitute the dominant source of health care
financing. In fiscal year 1973, of the $80 billion spent on personal
health care, government paid 38 percent and private insurance ac-
counted for another 26 percent; only about 35 percent was paid di-
rectly by the recipient of the services. 54 The dramatic growth in the
role of third-party payers5 5 seems likely to continue, particularly if some
form of national health insurance is enacted. 6
Regardless of the nature of the organization acting as third-party
payer, it will need to process great quantities of medical data in dis-
charging its functions. Statistical analyses must be performed for ac-
tuarial and planning purposes, program evaluation, cost and quality
control, and the like. In these respects, the third-party payers share
many of the characteristics and problems of health statistics systems
described above. All third-party payers must also handle personally
identifiable information in processing and paying claims. And, if the
third-party payer is an insurer which issues individual rather than
group policies, it will need some identifiable medical records to accom-
plish its underwriting task.57 As the following examples indicate, both
underwriting and claims processing have given rise to complex, large-
scale computer systems.
1. Underwriting Information: The Medical Information Bureau.
A commercial insurance company writing health or life insurance poli-
cies for individual customers must have some means of determining
53. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
54. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE RESOURCE BooK 68-69 (1974). See also id. at 66-67.
55. See id. at 68, where the Committee staff finds:
The distribution of personal health care expenditures by payment source has
changed considerably in the past 20 years. In fiscal 1950, the sources and
shares were as follows: Direct payments by patients (68 percent), Federal-
State-Local governments (20 percent), private health insurance (9 percent),
and philanthropy and others (3 percent).
56. For a summary of major national health insurance bills introduced in the
Ninety-Third Congress, see id. at 519-74.
57. Because the Blue Cross plans originated as localized "community service or-
ganizations" which based their rates on the general health needs of a particular area,
they had little need to evaluate the health condition or risk of a particular individual in
issuing policies:
Initially all Blue Cross plans offered hospital insurace to all members of the
community at uniform rates, one rate for individuals and one rate for fami-
lies, while commercial companies offered more favorable rates to those groups
and individuals who were actuarially less likely to make claims. Since low in-
come families and the aged tend to utilize hospital services more than the gen-
eral population, these groups are helped by community rating.
S. LAW at 12.
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the likelihood that the events insured against will happen, so that a
proper premium can be charged.58 In modem life insurance practice,
this decision requires not only general knowledge about the likelihood
of death at a particular age, but also specific data about the health
of the individual insurance applicant which would tend to indicate
whether he presents a high risk:
The use of a mortality table, which accurately estimates the
longevity of aggregates of people of a given age, is not strictly appli-
cable to an individual, for such a table assumes an average state
of health .... Despite the certainty of death, variations arise as to
when death will occur and the amount of total payments that will be
made prior to that eventuality. To ascertain the risk these variations
represent, the underwriter must refine the basic longevity estimate
provided for by a mortality table for the applicant's age group. These
refinements mandate inquiries as to the state of the applicant's health
and other non-medical data which could adversely affect his longevity
estimate.59
Because insurance applicants who are rejected or charged high pre-
miums will sometimes suppress evidence of a medical condition in
hopes of obtaining better terms from another insurer, many companies
in the industry have long shared underwriting data. Over the years,
these information-sharing operations have been institutionalized to
create an interlocking network of health data systems.
The focal point of this network is the computerized data bank
operated by the Medical Information Bureau (MIB), a trade associa-
tion of more than 700 life insurance companies.6 Most of these in-
surers have computer terminals in their own offices, 61 and for a cost of
about 20 cents per inquiry62 they can directly search the MIB health
58. Cf. Stem, Medical Information Bureau: The Life Insurer's Databank, 4 RUT-
GERS J. COMPUTERS & LAw 1, 3-4 (1974). This commentator states:
The concept of insurance is predicated upon a mutual sharing of the risk of a
common hazard, by joint contributions to a common fund. Such a plan is un-
workable unless each participant pays into the fund an amount which is pro-
portional to the risk he imposes on the fund. The insurer's function is to set up
a schedule of premiums correlating to risks and to place each participant in the
correct premium grouping.
Id.
59. Id. at 4.
60. See generally Stem, supra note 58; Hearings on Commercial Health and Acci-
dent Insurance Industry Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on Commercial Health Insurance].
61. About 500 of the insurance companies participating in MIB have direct access
to the files through remote terminals; the remainder submit inquiries by mail. Hearings
on Commercial Health Insurance at 105.
62. Id. at 39.
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files covering more than 12 million individuals.08 If the insurance ap-
plicant has previously sought insurance from a participating company,
his file may contain a large body of data arguably relevant to the un-
derwriting decision:
The coded data may sometimes indicate what type of condition was
diagnosed, what parts of the body were affected, how long ago it was
present and whether it is present today, how often it has re-
occurred . . , whether it was treated by surgery, and whether the
information came from a physician, a hospital, or a sanatorium or
clinic.
The official list of potential impairments runs some 22 pages
and contains special codes for possible hereditary conditions. One
group covers nervous problems, including personality disorders . .. ,
alcoholism, and drug dependence; codes of sexual deviation and social
maladjustments have recently been eliminated.6
This comprehensive data base is supplied by the participating insurers
who in turn obtain it from a variety of sources, each of which poses
some risk that the information will be inaccurate, or that it will be
disseminated and used for purposes unknown and unsuspected by the
insurance applicant.
The most obvious source of health data is the applicant himself,
who is typically asked detailed questions about his medical history.
The risks of inaccurate recording at this stage may be substantial: in
addition to the applicant's likely difficulties in recalling significant
details of his own treatment history65 and the insurance salesman's
lack of expertise in medical matters, distortion may result from the
applicant's desire to suppress data that might raise his rates, and the
insurance agent's desire to minimize factors that might undermine
the transaction and thus jeopardize his commission.00
63. Id. at 114. The number of files is growing at the rate of 3 percent per year. Id.
64. Pascoe, MIB: It Has 12 Million Americans At Its Fingertips, PiusM, June, 1974,
at 29, 30-31.
65. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
66. Cf. Statement of John E. Gregg, Chairman, Policyholders Protective Associa-
tion International, Hearings on Fair Credit Reporting Act-1973 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 586 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on FCRA]. The following
is part of the statement by John E. Gregg:
Based on my experience in selling and supervising salespeople, and from re-
viewing thousands of photocopied applications attached to policies on which
people are paying premiums today, I am convinced that at least 40% of the
health information recorded on them is defective and erroneous. Much of it
comes from salespeople not sufficiently trained to r*cord the medical informa-
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If the insurance company conducts an independent background
investigation of the applicant, there may be problems both of inac-
curacy and of unauthorized dissemination of sensitive health informa-
tion. This function is frequently performed by an independent com-
merical "investigative reporting agency," a field which is dominated
by one corporation, the Retail Credit Company.67 Retail Credit makes
some 15 million investigative reports annually, of which 70 percent
are "insurance reports." 68
In a life insurance background investigation, Retail Credit may
try to uncover for the insurer information about "the applicant's duties,
his finances, his health history, the extent of his use of alcohol, his
mode of living, and hazardous avocations." 69 Critics, including the
Federal Trade Commission, have charged that the information as-
sembled by Retail Credit is not only frequently wrong as a result of
slipshod investigative practices,7 but that it may be falsely repre-
tion properly on application forms. Again, much of what applicants tell sales-
people is "doctored" in hopes it will pass and earn a commission ....
A staggering amount of information turned in on health insurance ap-
plications is out-and-out fiction. Applications are taken from customers and
filled out properly in their presence. Later, salespeople, agency office clerks, or
other personnel . . . re-write them completely, forging not only the health
information, but even customer's signatures.
Id.
67. The Federal Trade Commission has alleged in an antitrust complaint that life
and health insurance reporting is a distinct relevant market, and that "Retail Credit has
maintained a market share of over 80 percent of this submarket for a number of years."
Complaint at paras. 8(c), 9(c), In re Retail Credit Co., No. 8920 (F.T.C., March 9,
1973).
68. Hearings on FCRA at 61. This figure apparently includes not only life and
health insurance investigations, but also other types such as fire and casualty, automo-
bile, etc. It apparently does not include investigations relating to claims made under in-
surance policies, which Retail Credit also performs. See id. at 61-62. The American
Life Insurance Association has estimated that nearly 8 million investigative consumer
reports were ordered by life insurance companies in 1972 for underwriting purposes.
69. Testimony of W. Lee Burge, President, Retail Credit Co., Hearings on FCRA
at 105.
70. E.g., note the following testimony of Albert A. Foer before the subcommittee:
I heard sworn testimony by former Retail Credit Co., inspectors . . . that
a Retail Credit Co. inspector "on circuit," which means out in the countryside
rather than in the city, will report on as many as 50 or 60 individuals a day,
and . . . with quantity quotas of this nature it is very difficult to maintain
accuracy and fairness, and as a result sometimes inspectors take short cuts and
sometimes they do a shoddy job of reporting.
. . . The Inspection bureaus say that they don't have quotas for protec-
tive [i.e., derogatory] information, they have norms but the way it works out
in practice, these norms are quotas.
Id. at 676-77. See also A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 70 (1971), where Mil-
ler states:
Given interrogation practices designed to provoke gossip, it is not surprising
that files produced during several congressional hearings contained comments
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sented to purchasers of the report as objective data based on personal
observation of the applicant or in-person interviews with his friends,
neighbors and co-workers.1 1 If derogatory "protective information,"
whether accurate or inaccurate, does turn up in a Retail Credit in-
surance investigation, its damaging effects may not be limited to the
700 life insurers who can obtain it through the MIB computers.1 2 Re-
tail Credit Co. has been described as "a personal information depart-
ment store"' 3 which, either directly or through subsidiaries, sells data
about individuals in a variety of information submarkets, including
local and national credit reporting, fire and casualty insurance report-
ing, and personnel reports requested by prospective employers. 4 Health
information gathered for life insurance underwriting may later prove
useful for these other purposes and, according to a Federal Trade
Commission complaint, Retail Credit retains a copy of the applicant's
insurance data in their own files for subsequent sale or use.75 If this is
so, the medical data may then move into a new information system,
and find even further uses and markets; at the same time, medical
from unidentified sources such as "peculiar," "scatterbrained," "neurotic," "psy-
chotic," and "has . . . a persecution complex." None of these remarks appears
to have had any medical or psychiatric basis. Other files included remarks about
the subject's drinking, aggressiveness, associations, health, hobbies, and activi-
ties.
71. This allegation is contained in a Federal Trade Commission complaint charg-
ing the company with deceptive practices and violations of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act. Complaint at paras. 9-10, In re Retail Credit Co., No. 8954 (F.T.C., Feb. 21, 1974).
72. The Executive Director of the MIB estimated in 1973 that 14 percent of the
MIB data came from investigative reporting companies like Retail Credit, through
member life insurance companies. Hearings on FCRA at 443. Pascoe reports that since
May of 1974 member companies may supply personal and financial data to MIB only
if it comes from the applicant himself; "[i]nformation about these areas obtained by
investigative agencies hired by carriers or company snooping by its own investigators is
now inadmissible." Pascoe, supra note 64, at 32. Of course, the rule is an effective safe-
guard for the data subject only if it is adequately enforced. Cf. note 86 infra & accom-
panying text.
73. Hearings on FCRA at 685.
74. The market descriptions are taken from the Federal Trade Commission's anti-
trust Complaint at paras. 8-9, In re Retail Credit Co., No. 8920 (F.T.C., Mar. 9, 1973).
See also testimony of W. Lee Burge, President, Retail Credit Co., Hearings on FGRA
at 57.
75. The FTC's deceptive practices complaint against Retail Credit, supra note 48,
at para. 5, alleges that contrary to the impression given interviewees by Retail Credites
investigators:
The information furnished by the consumer or others during an interview, will
not be used exclusively by the company to which the consumer has applied for
a benefit. The information is added to respondent's files for future reference in
connection with any subsequent requests by other customers for reports on the
consumer, who is the subject of the interview.
Retail Credit has denied that it "indiscriminately makes such reports available to its
field representatives for use in consumer reports that might be ordered at a later date."
Hearings on FCRA at 117.
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and related information generated for these other operations, or pur-
chased from other data systems, may be useful for life insurance
underwriting.7 6
Two other sources of medical data for the MIB system, physi-
cal examinations by insurance company physicians and reports by
doctors or institutions who have treated the applicant in the past, may
seem at first glance to be less susceptible to error or to diversion of the
data into improper uses. However, some serious questions have been
raised. Personal physicians and health care providers apparently have
diverse policies for dealing with insurance investigators, ranging from
relatively unsupervised access to raw files77 to deliberate falsification
of reports78 -either of which can produce an erroneous file entry.
Family physicians are also frequently slow to provide the requested
information, and this delay can be costly to the insurer, particularly
if the applicant changes his mind about purchasing insurance in the
interim. Transforming this problem into an opportunity, Retail Credit
developed an Underwriting Medical History service which offers to
expedite the transmission of the physicians' statements from the appli-
76. One such possibility is suggested by the following description of Retail Credit's
relationship with one state's motor vehicle department:
[A]ny individual or organization for a 50 cent charge can purchase [from the
New York State Department of Motor Vehicles] the print out of a specific
license or registration record. Information such as motorist accident reports
(which in many states are confidential) can also be purchased in New York
for $3.50. . . . [T]he Retail Credit Company, a leading investigative service
for the insurance industry, buys approximately I million print outs a year,
primarily for use in its automobile and life-insurance reports. The insurance
industry itself buys upwards of 100,000 print outs per month....
In recognition of the volume of this trade, the department is currently
considering the request by the Retail Credit Company and some insurance
companies to have on-line terminals installed connecting their offices with the
department.
WESTIN & BAKER at 74.
77. Holton, An Alert to Physicians About Photocopying Patient Records, PXUsM,
June, 1974. In his article, Holton states:
In 1973, AMA's Council on Medical Services expressed concern over the
apparently increasing frequency with which insurance companies are sending
their employees or agents into physicians' offices to photograph medical records.
In some cases, although photographing of records is not involved, com-
pany representativeg are offering to look through patient records "to save
the doctor time and effort."
Id. at 32.
78. See, e.g., Caveat Shrink, TRIAL, July/August 1974, at 10 which reads:
A survey of 247 psychiatrists in Massachusetts revealed that many psychia-
trists have lied about patients' conditions or advised patients to lie because
of insurance companies' inability to properly evaluate the conditions of psychi-
atric patients. The psychiatrists claimed that insurance companies regard all
patients, regardless of the severity of the disorder, as such potential risks that
many cannot get, or afford, life insurance.
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cant's doctor to the insurance underwriter.1 9 In the process, Retail
Credit reportedly takes care to deposit a copy of the physician's state-
ment in its files, for use in future investigations.80 Retail Credit has
also attempted to become the processor of medical data generated when
the applicant is examined by an insurance company doctor, by estab-
lishin'g a chain of service centers "staffed by technicians trained to re-
ceive medical history, perform certain laboratory tests and take the
physical measurements of applicants.""' These paramedical examina-
tion centers may reduce costs by conserving expensive physicians' time,
but they also create a new fund of medical data which may be useful
to Retail Credit for a variety of purposes, 82 and which is outside the
control of both the consumer and the medical profession.
Aside from the possibility that Retail Credit or a similar organi-
zation can divert to its own uses part of the stream of data flowing
into the MIB, there remains the question of whether medical data is
likely to be misused after it enters the Bureau's computers. One pos-
sibility frequently mentioned by critics is that participating insurance
companies will use information that was obtained in processing the life
insurance application for other purposes. Since many of the life in-
surers who participate in MIB also sell health or accident insurance in
which the insured's physical condition is relevant to the underwriting
decision,83 there is at least a temptation to use the data for multiple
purposes. Another problem is underwriters' reliance on possibly wrong
or misleading MIB data in deciding whether to insure the applicant
or to assign him to a special high-risk category. The internal rules
governing the MIB system prohibit reliance on file information with-
79. Testimony of Albert A. Foer, Hearings on FCRA at 685. See also id. at 723,
where it is reported that Retail Credit handled over 26,000 such reports in the month of
June, 1972.
80. Id.
81. 1971 Retail Credit Co. Annual Report, in Hearings on FCRA at 685.
82. See Hearings on FCRA at 722. File integration seems common at Retail Credit;
the FTC's deceptive practices complaint against the company, supra note 71, at para-
graph 28, charges:
[R]espondent retains file copies of the information contained in the consumer
reports and claims reports which it prepares for its customers. Respondent in-
corporates all of said information into the same filing system, making no at-
tempt to segregate the consumer report information from the claims informa-
tion. In the preparation of subsequent consumer reports, respondent uses all
of its file information interchangeably ....
83. In the 1973 hearings on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, for example, Senator
Kennedy asserted that 87 percent of all health and accident insurance coverage in the
country is sold by life insurance companies. Hearing on FCRA at 432.
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out independent verification, 4 but corroborating a suspicious item may
be costly and burdensome for the insurer:
Since MIB reports never reveal the reporting company [that put the
data in the system], if after filing the initial request for MIB informa-
tion the requesting company seeks greater detail, it must file a second
request with the MIB. The MIB forwards this request to the re-
porting company for it to deal with at its discretion. A requesting
company may be discouraged from taking such action for the number
of requests which it is allowed is limited. Furthermore, due to compe-
tition between insurers, the information may not be forthcoming.8 5
Member companies might be prevented from violating the MIB's con-
sumer protection rules through a vigorous self-policing and sanction-
ing policy; however, the magnitude of MIB's commitment to enforce-
ment of its rules has not been impressive in the past.8 6
Beyond the details of ways in which personal medical records
can be used or misused in life insurance underwriting, the MIB ex-
perience seems suggestive of general problems that are likely to arise
in attempts to control commercial uses of sensitive information. When
extensive files of personal information are a major asset for a business
organization, s7 the data base is likely to be relatively costly in time
or money to collect, particularly if accuracy is important and the in-
formation sought is more judgmental than the bare facts of a retail
transaction. Once this fixed cost is met, however, the low cost of sup-
plying the information to subsequent users may make it attractive to
84. See, e.g., statement of Joseph C. Wilberding, Executive Director and General
Counsel, Medical Information Bureau, part of which reads as follows:
Members are not permitted to underwrite risks on the basis of the information
received from MIB. They may not rate or decline an application on the basis of
such information. When alerted of an MIB record, the member company, under
MIB rules, is required to make its own independent investigation. Its ultimate
decision on the application must then be based on the results of such investiga-
tion.
Id. at 458-59.
85. Stem, supra note 58, at 9-10.
86. In 1973 congressional hearings, the Executive Director of MIB revealed that"
the Bureau's staff to spot check the insurers' compliance with its rules consisted of one
man who "spends a great deal of his time on it." Hearings on FCRA at 447. By mid-
1974, it was reported that MIB had two full-time investigators checking on compli-
ance. Pascoe, supra note 64, at 48. See also Stem, supra note 58, at 30-31.
87. This would not be the case where the demand was for new information rather
than historical file data-for example, in the "classic" divorce situation where one
partner retains an investigator to substantiate suspicions about the other partner's cur-
rent liasons. For this type of operation, capital requirements are low and barriers to
entry fairly minimal. See Foer, The Personal Information Market, in Hearings on FCRA
at 695, 740. Even in this commercial setting, "old information" from the files might




find multiple markets for the data base.88 Some kinds of personal in-
formation-unfortunately including medical records-seem commer-
cially useful for a variety of purposes. Knowledge that a person had
been diagnosed as having cancer would be relevant to employers mak-
ing hiring or promotion decisions, enterprises considering loans or
other commercial transactions involving the individual, and insurers
in the life, health, accident, and possibly automobile markets; per-
haps even a mailing list composed of cancer patients would be salable.
Against these kinds of incentives, there appear to be few barriers
impeding the widespread, repetitive dissemination of sensitive data.
Personal information is a commodity that is not necessarily depleted
or altered through repeated use; consequently, the possibilities for
commercial exploitation are as expansive as the problems of control-
ling information once it has been disclosed. 9 Moreover, the bounda-
ries of systems and organizations seem easy to cross under existing
law and custom. In the life insurance context, a simple authorization
from the insurance applicant, easily extracted and uninformedly
given, 0 is sufficient to remove most practical obstacles and permit the
88. Precise information about these relationships is, not surprisingly, hard to find.
Foer, supra note 87, at 729, found that the re-investigation of a disputed item by an
organization like Retail Credit could cost up to $100, and that in the highly competi-
tive Chicago market the average rate for "open-ended" (i.e., nonstandardized) investi-
gations was $10.50 per hour in 1972. By contrast, the cost of supplying a report from
MIB's computers at about the same time was, as previously mentioned, about 20 cents.
See text accompanying note 62 supra.
89. An illustration of the difficulties of imposing restraints on the use of personal
information can be found in the 1973 hearings on the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Senator
Kennedy testified, presumably on the basis of information given him by the agency, that
"if [an] insurance company, on behalf of an individual applying for health or life insur-
ance, requests medical information from the Veterans Administration, the VA will sup-
ply it but does not permit the company to pass that information on to the Medical In-
formation Bureau [MIB]." Hearings on FCRA at 429. However, the MIB later informed
the committee that "about 2 of I percent of the total MIB codes [i.e., items of informa-
tion relevant to the underwriting decision] came from the V.A." Id. at 512.
90. Prior to recent criticism of the MIB in the press and the Congress, most in-
surance application authorizations for investigation did not even alert the applicant to
the existence of the MIB, much less the role it would play in processing his medical
records. See Pascoe, supra note 64, at 31. COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 28, 1974, at 1, spoke
to this issue in the following:
Effective Jan. 1, the Medical Information Bureau (MIB) will no longer
be able to collect and store confidential health information on insurance appli-
cants without their knowledge or access as a result of pressure brought by the
state insurance commissioners of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.
The new policies specify that insurance applicants be "prenotified" in writ-
ing that health data they supply will be transmitted to the MIB for storage in a
computerized data bank where there is a possibility the information may be
shared among the various member insurance companies.




data to flow freely from the doctor's and hospital's record systems to
those of MIB and Retail Credit, and thus perhaps on to still other
systems. This atmosphere of cooperation rather than competition re-
garding sources and files of personal information, which may be com-
mon in a variety of commercial settings beyond the insurance industry,
indicates the range of incentives and institutional relationships that
need to be taken into account in evaluating proposals to control com-
mercial uses of personal information. Simple abolition of highly visi-
ble computer targets like the MIB, as some have urged,91 would in all
likelihood simply lead to re-creation of the same information-sharing
functions in a different guise, possibly with higher costs and unde-
sirable side effects.92
2. Claims processing: the Medicare program. Despite MIB's image
as an information goliath feeding on millions of files, it is really a
small-time operation compared to data systems that have been de-
veloped to process medical claims in the maj6r government health care
programs. A brief look at the information flows within ofne of these
federal programs, Medicare, may suggest both the magnitude and the
complexity of data systems used in claims processing.
Medicare, a health care program for the aged using an insurance
model, was a major but nevertheless limited step by the federal gov-
ernment into the field of health care financing. Its limits fall into two
general categories which would also be present to a greater or lesser
degree in many private health insurance systems: (1) prescriptions on
the classes of people who are entitled to coverage and the services they
can receive (which in Medicare included ceilings on the benefits each
covered individual could receive for each "spell of illness");93 and
(2) controls on the amounts paid out for covered services (specifically,
some assurance that the treatment was medically necessary and that the
costs to be reimbursed were within established norms).94 The Social
91. See, e.g., statement of Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., Health Research Group, Hear-
ings on FCRA at 434-36.
92. The MIB has argued that simple abolition of its information system would re-
sult in a competitive advantage to large insurance companies, accompanied by a risk
that small or medium sized companies would be driven out of the market and competi-
tion reduced. This would come about because the large companies would agree to share
data accumulated in their own files; the small companies, lacking a sufficiently compre-
hensive data base to entice larger companies to share with them, would be squeezed out.
Hearings on FCRA at 472. If this is a realistic evaluation, the result would be that a
simple control strategy-abolition of the offending information system-would quickly
raise much more complex questions about what government should do, and what level
of government should do it, to offset or avoid these anticompetitive consequences.
93. See text accompanying notes 95-98 infra.
94. Of course, health insurance payment schedules could be based on principles other
than cost reimbursement. For a brief discussion of the political factors that led to adoption
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Security Administration (SSA), as the agency operating the govern-
ment's retirement, survivors and disability benefits programs, was a
logical candidate for taking over the administration of Medicare, but
it was not given the entire job; instead, the private sector, predomi-
nantly the insurance industry, was given a role in claims processing.
As these shared responsibilities are reflected in information systems,
SSA has primary control -over eligibility information, while nonfed-
eral "carriers" and "intermediaries" perform most of the collection
and analysis of cost data, and make the initial determinations to pay
or reject claims.
The Social Security Administration maintains at its computer
center some 20 million "health insurance master records which contain
information about individuals' entitlement to Medicare benefits and a
record of their utilization of covered services," 95 together with addi-.
tional file systems containing the personal information needed for
other programs administered by SSA.06 The 130 carriers and inter-
mediaries participating in the Medicare program, who need eligibility
information in deciding whether to pay claims, can obtain direct access
to the health insurance master records through telecommunications
links, and they in turn update the individual beneficiary's "utiliza-
tion record" on the master file when they pay a claim.97 The central
files are also accessible to the more than 1,000 district and branch
offices which SSA maintains around the country to answer inquiries
of the cost reimbursement principle in Medicare, and criticism of its effects, see Hodgson,
The Politics of American Health Care, THE ATLANTIC, October, 1973, at 45, 52-53.
95. Hearings of Federal Information Systems and Plans Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 280 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Federal Information Systems]. See also id. at 271.
96. The other major files maintained by SSA at its central computer complex were
described as follows in the 1973 hearings:
1) Master earnings record, for making entitlement decisions under Social Se-
curity old age disability and similiar programs-207 million accounts with
343 million earnings items posted annually;
2) Master beneficiary record of those who are currently entitled to receive bene-
fits-33 million individuals;
3) Supplemental Security Income master file relating to income maintenance
for eligible aged, blind and disabled individuals, estimated to contain 5.3
million persons when the program became fully operable.
These statistics apparently do not include records used for smaller programs adminis-
tered by SSA, such as the black lung program which paid benefits to some 250,000
people. Testimony of Richard D. Shepherd, Director, Division of Systems Coordination
and Planning, Office of Administration, Social Security Administration, Hearings on Fed-
eral Information Systems, pt. 2, at 271.
97. See id. at 274.
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from the public, assist individuals in applying for benefits, correct
records, and the like.98
The second general part of the claims processing function under
Medicare, determining the appropriate amount of reimbursement
for treatment rendered to eligible beneficiaries, is complicated by the
existence of two different kinds of delivery systems for health services:
institutions such as hospitals or nursing homes, and individual physi-
cians. This distinction has been acknowledged in the statute and in
administrative practice by significantly different approaches to cost
determinations; both "Part A" and "Part B," however, require sub-
stantial quantities of individual medical records.9
Part A, dealing with reimbursement to hospitals and other insti-
tutional providers, works through a system of "fiscal intermediaries" or
entities designated by the providers0 ° to make reimbursement de-
terminations, disburse funds, audit the providers, and generally serve
as a conduit of information between SSA and the participating insti-
tutions.' 0 ' When a Medicare patient is hospitalized, the hospital for-
wards information about the treatment and the bill for services ren-
dered to the intermediary which, after obtaining eligibility information
from SSA, decides how much of the claim should be paid. 02 From the
98. Id. at 271. Portions of master records are also physically available on micro-
form in the district offices.
Each district and branch office has as the backbone of its information sys-
tem a file of the master records in clear language for all Social Security Admin-
istration beneficiaries living within the State. This file is in alphabetic order
and is on microfiche . . . .The file is completely reissued every 6 months and
contains not only active master beneficiary records but [also] records of disallow-
ances, railroad retirement eligibility, and entitlement to black lung benefits.
With this file, a social security employee is able to answer many questions
while the individual is on the telephone or at the office.
Id. at 285.
99. It should be noted that the following descriptions focus only on aspects of
the Medicare program which require substantial quantities of individuals' records, and
even within this limited scope many of the details are overlooked. For a more thorough
discussion of the administration of Part A, see S. LAw.
100. The fiscal intermediary may be a private organization or a public entit, and
the provider's choice of intermediary will be approved by the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare unless the Secretary can make a finding that this would not be
consistent with efficient and effective operation of the program. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(a)
(1970). See also S. LAw at 33.
101. Hearings on Administration of Federal Health Benefit Programs Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
88 (1970). See also S. LAw at 33. The intermediaries may also have some less important
responsibilities, such as conducting management studies and participating in statistical
research. Id. See also Homer & Platten, Medicare Provider Reimbursement Disputes:
An Analysis vf the Administrative Hearing Procedures, 63 GEO. L.J. 107 (1974).
102. A more detailed step-by-step description of the information exchanges in-
volved in this kind of transaction may be found in Hearings on Federal Information
Systems, pt. 2, at 287-88.
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beginning of the Medicare program, the overwhelmingly dominant
intermediary has been the Blue Gross Association, 0 3 a national trade
association of local Blue Cross plans which had already developed its
own wire communications network to serve its policyholders. 104 The
Blue Cross Association, as prime contractor, has subcontracted or re-
delegated most of the administrative functions to its constituent local
Blue Gross plans, and these plans in turn may further subcontract
auditing, data processing or other functions to private firms.10 5 Thus,
Part A claims processing centers around two interconnected data net-
works: the BGA headquarters, fed by its local plans and their sub-
contractors, and the SSA computer center, interacting with its branch
offices. These linked systems have further "interfaces"-whether man-
ual or electronic-with other data systems for both input (for exam-
ple, billing information from a hospital administrative data system) 00
103. In 1970, for example, Blue Cross was fiscal intermediary for 93 per cent of
the participating hospitals, and 53 percent of the extended care facilities. Testimony
of Robert Mayne, Assistant Bureau Director, Division of Intermediary Operations, Social
Security Administration, Hearings on Administration of Federal Health Benefit Programs,
supra note 101, pt. 1, at 89.
104. Evolution of the wire network has been attributed to the mobility of Blue
Cross policyholders:
When the Blue Cross system identified the need for out-of-area benefits, a
program called the interplan service bank was developed, meaning if a person
insured under a plan in California got sick in New York, arrangements were
made between the plans to cover the benefits ....
In addition, as . .. society becomes more mobile, [the Blue Cross system]
found people began to move, and they wanted to carry their Blue Cross bene-
fits from one area to another, and [the Blue Cross Association] set up an inter-
plan transfer program ....
Because of these operating responsibilities, [the Blue Cross Association]
developed a vast wire telecommunications network to facilitate the operation.
Testimony of Bernard R. Tresnowski, Senior Vice President, Blue Cross Association, id.
pt. 2, at 222-23. The dominant role of BCA among intermediaries has been attributed
not only to its organizational structure and wire communications facility, but also to
the Association's "lobbying" among hospitals to be designated as intermediary. See S. LAW
at 41.
105. S. LAw at 41-42.
106. The provider apparently has little control or discretion in deciding what kinds
of medical record data may properly be released to an intermediary. See, e.g., MASSA-
cnusETTs GoVERNOR'S COMIISSION ON PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA, HEALTH AND
PRIVACY: A REPORT OF CURRENT PRACTICES (Nov. 1974), part of which reads:
Most carriers, private and Blue Cross, and governmental reimbursement
systems-Medicaid and Medicare-provide their own forms to hospitals. There
is little discretion left to the hospital in completing the form, because if the
hospital wants to be reimbursed, it must provide the information requested. On
the other hand, most claim forms, even Medicare, provide for patient authori-
zation for release of information pertinent to the processing of the claim.
The authorizations are peremptory, and somewhere open-ended, but arguably
they serve the purpose, at least, of alerting the patient to the fact that some




and output (for example, requests from SSA to the Treasury Depart-
ment to issue checks for reimbursement).10 7
Development of data processing systems for handling payments to
individual physicians under Part B of Medicare has been more diffi-
cult than the evolution of systems under Part A, perhaps because of
the greater number and more decentralized nature of the Part B pro-
viders.'08 In addition, Part B has a higher volume of claims because
eligible beneficiaries are treated by physicians more frequently than
they are admitted to hospitals or extended care facilities. 0 9 The reim-
bursement formula for Part B also contributed to administrative prob-
lems because it is a complex calculus which requires collection and
analysis of large bodies of data relating to prevailing rates for similar
services in the relevant locality:
[T1he program is to pay 80 percent of reasonable charges after the
deductible has been met, but in determining the reasonable charge,
the carrier must take into consideration the customary charge of
the individual physician to all of his patients for similar service and
then screen that against the prevailing charge for similar services made
by other doctors in the community, and then screen that further
against what it would pay under a program of its own which was
similar in scope and nature.
In addition to this, medicare for the first time put a good deal
of emphasis on the medical necessity of the service . . . and it put
responsibility on the carrier for determining patterns of utilization,
and for establishing parameters which would identify any aberrant
patterns of utilization by individual physicians."10
Finally, the private insurance "carriers" administering payments-who
are the Part B equivalents of the Part A intermediaries::"--did not
have adequate electronic data processing facilities or expertise to handle
the enormous numbers of claims generated by Part B."12 Gradually,
107. Cf. Hearings on Federal Information Systems at 274. If an intermediary is
not a member of the Blue Cross Association network, it may use the SSA district office
network for its claims processing work. Id. at 287.
108. Part B involves reimbursement for 200,000 private physicians, in contrast
to the 10,000 institutional providers covered by Part A. S. LAw at 5.
109. In fiscal year 1973, over 19 million bills from hospitals and other facilities
were processed under Medicare, while over 58 million bills for physician services were
processed during the same period. NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE REsOURCE Boor, supra
note 54, at 429.
110. Hearings on Administration of Federal Health Benefit Programs, supra note
101, pt. 3, at 5.
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (1970).
112. Hearings on Administration of Federal Health Benefit Programs, supra note
101, pt. 3, at 260. The result was that "a huge backlog of claims" had accumulated
under Part B by 1967. Id. at 5.
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private data processing companies have taken on the information-
handling requirements of Part B through subcontracts with the car-
riers. The dominant firm in the market, Electronic Data Systems,'18
operates on a national basis and offers carriers a complete data process-
ing service that includes work related not only to Medicare benefi-
ciaries but'als6 to the carriers' private policyholders.1 14More recently, another layer of cost control (and therefore of
medical record processing) has been added to Medicare by legisla-
tion creating Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO's).'"
The PSRO's generally will be groups of physicians whose main func-
tions are monitoring the necessity and quality of medical services and
stablishing professional norms of practice within their geographic
areas." 6 To perform these duties, the PSRO's, like the Part B car-
riers, will require a large statistical data base against which to screen
particular case histories." 7 Because of economies of scale, these data
113. See id. at 22-23, where it is reported that the total cost for electronic data
processing under Part B was $48 million in FY 1971; of this amount, $23 million
was subcontracted, and $20.7 million worth of these subcontracts were held by EDS.
114. The Social Security System contracted in 1968 for the development of a
"model" data processing system for Part B -claims. See id. at 5. But the more diversified
services offered by EDS were apparently more attractive to the carriers:
One feature of their system which is quite different from the Pilot, or Model
system, for example, is that EDS is in a position to go in and take over, not
only the medicare data processing phase of an organization's operations, but
also their own business operations. In other words, they can do a whole job for
them. They move in their own people. It was a problem for many carriers
just to get qualified EDP personnel, and EDS has been successful in securing
a number of contracts.
Testimony of Thomas M. Tierney, Director, Bureau of Health Insurance, Social Secur-
ity Administration, id. at 5-6.
115. See generally 86 Stat. 1429-45 (1972).
116. Office of Professional Standards Review of U.S. Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare, PSRO's and Medical Information-Safeguards to Privacy 10 (un-
published. July 22, 1974; copy available in the files of the Buffalo Law Review) [here-
inafter cited as PSRO's and Medical Information]. Prior to the PSRO legislation, the
primary safeguard to assure that hospitalization was medically necessary under Part A of
Medicare was the attending physician's certification of need for treatment. See 42 U.S.C.§ 1395f(a) (3) (1970). In addition, there was a requirement that participating hospitals
establish their own "utilization review committees" to determine the need for hospitali-
zation and the quality of the care provided. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e) (2), (j) (8), (k)
(1970); S. LAw at 119-21. For a discussion of the problems with this system that gave
rise to the PSRO approach, see Note, Federally-Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical
Practice: A Critique of the Professional Standards Review Organization, 42 Gto. WASH.
L. Rnv. 822 (1971); PSRO's and Medical Information at 10. Hospital utilization review
committees may be retained under the new system, but PSRO is responsible for the
effectiveness of their review. See Note, supra, at 825-26.
117. The statute gives PSRO's broad authority to gather information relevant to
their duties. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-4(f) (1) (B) (Supp. 1973). At the same time it re-
quires them to utilize "to the greatest extent practical" coding methods which "provide
maximum confidentiality as to patient identity." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-4(a) (4), c-15
(Supp. 1973). The HEW report, PSRO's and Medical Information, at 10, notes, "For
[Vol. 25
1.975] COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL RECORDS 67
bases will probably be stored in a series of compatible regional com-
puter centers, each collecting information from a, number of local
PSRO's. n 8 Thus, a new national data network for handling medical
information may be in its formative stages." 9
As massive as the Medicare program is, it constitutes only a part
of the maze of federal health care programs, each of vhich varies in
size, complexity and approach. Medicaid, for example, paralleled
Medicare by providing federal support for health care to the poor,
20
thereby giving rise to extensive data-sharing relationships between
state and federal welfare agencies,1 2 and frequently with private con-
the setting of norms based upon the 'typical patterns of practice in the region where
the PSRO is located' . . . an enormous amount of data will have to be collected to de-
termine what practice is typical with respect to care, diagnosis and treatment."
118. The possibility of integrating PSRO, Medicare, and National Health Insurance
into a single system is prominently mentioned in a document prepared by a Department
of Health, Education and Welfare Task Force on PSRO Information Systems Model(s),
Nov. 15, 1974, at 3:
As one alternative, consideration was given to appending the PSRO data and
processing to the existing Medicare and Medicaid payment systems. A pxoto-
typical model was developed reflecting an achievable and desirable concept
which would require major changes in existing agency functions. Should Na-
tional Health Insurance be enacted this model may be the optimum approach
to the information system. The urgency of the PSRO information needs and the
problems associated with modifications of the Medicare and Medicaid billing
systems strongly indicates that an "interim" PSRO information processing
system should be established.
It should be noted that sharing of data processing facilities would not necessarily involve
sharing of data. In discussing the establishment of "group processors" to provide groups
of PSRO's with data processing services, this report states:
The data acquired and processed at the group processor will be organized and
maintained on a local PSRO basis. No further aggregation of this data is ex-
pected at this point. .
Id. at 5. See also Hearings on Administration of Federal Health Benefit Programs Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operationi, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3,
at 168 (1971).
119. Because a large part of the data handled by PSRO's is statistical in nature, it
may be possible to delete or obscure identifying information and thereby minimize threats
to individual privacy. In the absence of specific rules governing the details of data
processing procedures, it seems rather premature to assert, as the Director of the ACLU's.
Project on Privacy and Data Collection has done, that the PSRO legislation marks "the
incipient stages of yet another massive system of databanks, a system whose fodder will
include some of the most sensitive information extant on millions of Americans." PSRO's
and Medical Information at 27.
120. See generally Stevens & Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy of a Dilemma, 35 LAw
& CONTE-MP. PROB. 348 (1970).
121. Federal-state information sharing extends beyond the health care field to other
categories of public assistance. See, e.g., the following statement by Richard D. Shepherd,-
Director, Division of Systems Coordination and Planning, Office of Administration, Social
Security Administration:
The BENDEX [beneficiary data exchange] system was devised jointly by
the Social Security Administration and the Social and Rehabilitation Service
(SRS) to provide State public assistance agencies with social security benefit in-
formation and an automatic notification to the States of any material change
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tractors as well.Ua Medical aid programs for more narrowly defined
social problems, such as alcoholism or drug abuse, also contribute to
the collection and sharing of medical information, and often these
programs interact with the record-keeping systems of other bureaucra-
cies. 128 Only rarely has there been a serious public examination of
the privacy implications of these various data systems, and efforts at
comprehensive analysis of personal information flows associated with
in the beneficiary/recipients social security status. . . The system is effective
in all States except Pennsylvania and for all categories of grants-in-aid ....
. .. The individual States will decide whether to pay their own supplement
to the supplemental security income benefit amounts and the scope of their
medicaid program after January 1, 1974, and whether they want Federal admin-
istration of either or both of these optional provisions. Regardless of a State's
options, information from the supplemental security record will be of use to the
States. For instance, the Social Security Administration will have the record of
resources available to the individual, mailing addresses, representative payee
involvement, etc., and via data exchange with States on a timely basis, much
redundancy can be avoided in establishing eligibility for State social service, or
State administered supplementation and/or medicaid.
Hearings on Federal Information Systems, pt. 2, at 290.
122. Cf. Hearings on National Health Insurance Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 7, at 3127 (1974). The following statement was
made by Margaret Ewine, National Health Law Program, Los Angeles, California, before
the committee:
Although [the statute] .. . makes no express provision for the use of fiscal in-
termediaries in the administration of the Medicaid program, many Blue Cross
and Blue Shield plans sought out and received roles in the program's adminis-
tration through negotiations with participating State agencies .... Blue Cross
[is involved] . . . in the administration of Medicaid in at least half the states.
Id. The Blues are not the only organizations from the private sector involved in ad-
ministration of Medicaid; according to newspaper reports, the state of North Carolina
has awarded a $405 million, 26-month contract to Health Application Systems
(HAS), a subsidiary of the California-based Bergen-Brunswick Corp., a health
products and services company. HAS has agreed to pay, out of the $405 million,
all valid [Medicaid] claims [by State residents], and hopes to run the operation
so efficiently that some will be left over as a profit.
The Washington Post, July 11, 1975, at A2, col. 1.
123. A brief history of the confidentiality provisions relating to drug abuse and
alcohol abuse patient records is set forth in the proposed rules issued by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare and the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Pre-
vention. 39 Fed. Reg. 30426, 30427-28 (1974). An example of the ways in which state
law or policy can frustrate federal confidentiality policies is provided by news reports of
a woman on probation for a state crime who was sent to a federally funded drug treat-
ment program, and told her counselor in the treatment program that she had used mari-
juana after she had been placed on probation. The counselor, in accord with the program's
policies, informed the woman's probation officer, the probation officer informed the
sentencing court, and the judge ordered a probation revocation hearing. Officials in
the federal funding agency were reportedly redrafting the regulations on confidentiality




third-party payment for medical services appear to be virtually non-
existent.124
Notwithstanding the complexities and gaps in knowledge, sev-
eral general tendencies affecting personal privacy do seem to emerge
from federal third-party payment programs like Medicare. A striking
characteristic of the evolution of Medicare and related programs is
the frequency with which information-processing tasks resulting from
newly legislated programs are added on to existing data systems.
Medicare, Medicaid, and later health-related programs were built into
existing data nets like the Blue Cross wire system and the Social Se-
curity beneficiary records, and a national health insurance program
would quite likely be planned around some existing data processing
facility.12 5 A variety of factors seem to contribute to this centralization
or sharing of data systems. Legislators or administrators developing
new benefits may be attracted to the model of a similar, functioning
program, and decide to incorporate the new into the old. By the same
token, officials who are responsible for administering a newly-enacted
program may be under political pressure to get it functioning quickly.
Expansion of an existing computer system, rather than development of
a completely new one, may make it possible to realize economies of
scale, or contribute to administrators' empire-building tendencies by
providing an occasion to upgrade facilities for other programs,126 or to
justify larger budgets. 2 7
124. A notable exception is the report of the MASSACHUSETTS GOVERNOR'S
COsISSSION ON PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA, supra note 106, which surveys health-
related record-keeping in the State of Massachusetts. This report is sometimes difficult
to follow, which doubtless is more a function of the complexity of the subject matter
being described than of the style of the author.
125. See, e.g., note 118 supra.
126. For example, the Social Security Administration's upgrading of its data process-
ing and telecommunications facilities under the acronym SSADARS (Social Security-
Administration Data Acquisition and Response System) was justified by the additional
data processing demands associated with the enactment of the supplemental security
income program; however, the system improvements will affect the operation of othe9-
benefit programs administered by SSA. See generally testimony of Richard D. Shepherd,
Director, Division of Systems Coordination and Planning, Office of Administration, Social'
Security Administration, Hearings on Federal Information Systems, pt. 2, at 270-73,
281-84.
127. This was reportedly one of the attractive features of the Multi-State Informa-
tion System in psychiatric patient records, described in text accompanying notes 21-24-
supra.
One of the strongest arguments for developing [MSIS] was the opportunity
of eliminating the inefficiencies that plague existing state psychiatric record-
keeping programs. The majority of non-MSIS states, even now, are only in the
earliest, most primitive stages of developing data processing methods to handle
psychiatric material. Principally a manual operation in most states until the last
few years, these programs are typically the stepsisters of statewide data process-
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The greater size of systems and data bases resulting from this ap-
parent trend toward centralization may not be perceived as a risk
to individual privacy interests, at least as they are traditionally de-
fined. Although the effect is to make the individual's record accessi-
ble to more people and institutions, there still may be little risk that
sensitive personal information will "leak" from the system and find its
way back to the data subject's circle of relatives and acquaintances.
Ironically, the risk that this kind of leakage will occur may be increased
if the data-processing organization attempts to be open and responsive
to its clientele rather than bureaucratic and remote. Recent congres-
sional testimony by an SSA official indicates both the dilemma facing
the agency, and the way in which it is likely to be resolved:
We are kind of in the middle between the need to efficiently
serve the people, which is our basic function, and the need to protect
the privacy and confidentiality of our records.
In taking 4, 5, or 6 million claims a year and processing 18 mil-
lion postentitlement earnings and posting 343 million earnings items,
when you are talking about this kind of operation, then we must set
up systems and operations so that the district office personnel can get
the information readily and efficiently.
Now if we put too many restrictions on obtaining it, then we
would have to get too much [identification or authorization] informa-
tion from people [who are requesting information about their entitle-
ment status], or so much information that it would be difficult to re-
spond to our mission.1 2 8
In addition, the more comprehensive, accurate and sensitive a data
base is, the greater will be the temptation to utilize it for a variety
of purposes, ranging from law enforcement to commercial gain to basic
or applied social science research. As the Social Security Administra-
tion has discovered, the basic threat here seems to arise not so much
from illegal intruders and wiretappers as from perfectly legitimate or-
ganizations and interests which are able to obtain access through
iug organizations, their data often being processed after data from such agencies
as the departments of taxation and motor vehicles. Many states feel the need
for efficient, automated, psychiatric reporting methods in order that large
budgets for mental health departments may be justified, the use of such funds
may be monitored, and appropriate care for the patient may be assured.
Curran, Laska, Kaplan & Bank, Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality, ScasNs,
Nov. 23, 1973, at 797.
128. Testimony of Richard D. Shepherd, Director, Division of Systems Coordina-
tion and Planning, Office of Administration, Social Security Administration, Hearings
on Federal Information Systems, pt. 2, at 324.
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political or legal means. 29 And even if large centralized stores of
personal data can be effectively protected against improper or unneces-
sary access, the popular perception of size and power may remain signifi-
cant: a widespread belief or suspicion that SSA used its computers as a
giant universal surveillance system would doubtless affect the relation-
ship between citizen and government in much the same way that an
actual surveillance system would.
A second significant trend that seems apparent in the evolution of
third-party payment systems is the pervasive interpenetration of public
and private sectors, and of federal and state levels of government, in
administering the programs. Undoubtedly, there have been both prac-
tical and political reasons for creating a mixed system of carriers, in-
termediaries, contractors, subcontractors, and federal and state agen-
cies to pay for health care services. Potentially greater resources and
expertise can be brought to bear on health care problems than any
one sector or level of government could provide acting alone; 30 the
129. An official of the Social Security Administration has described some of the
demands made on that agency in the following terms:
[V]arious kinds of requests and demands are received by the Social Security
Administration in large numbers daily, and millions are responded to yearly.
Attorneys seek information helpful to their clients and frequently try to obtain
it by subpoena where the individual concerned refuses to authorize disclosure.
Missing persons bureaus and skip-tracer organizations try to get information
about persons who have disappeared or have moved leaving no address. Busi-
ness firms seek data about the size or business or wage patterns of competitors.
Organizations request listings of names and addresses for a variety of reasons.
Pension fund administrators request wage information. Political organizations
and public officials seek information for political advantages.
Law enforcement agencies, naturally are interested in the potential that
exists for locating persons.
W. Rubenstein, Confidentiality Under the Social Security Act 8-9 (unpublished, undated;
copy available in the files of the Buffalo Law Review). A recent example of a successful
attempt to gain access to SSA records is the congressionally-created "parent locator
system" which allows welfare officials access to SSA and other federal data systems for
the purpose of tracking down parents who have defaulted on their obligation to support
minor children. See id. at 21; The Washington Post, June 26, 1975, at A3, col. 6.
130. Cf. Hearings on National Health Insurance Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 7, at 2771-72 (1974). The following is part of
a statement by Wilbur J. Cohen, of the American Public Welfare Association:
There is considerable difference of opinion as to the respective roles of the
public and private sectors in health financing, organization, delivery, cost con-
tainment, and preventive services. . . . The arguments given for utilizing the
private sector in these areas usually overstate the case as to what the competitive
market forces can contribute to increased efficiency, effectiveness, and access to
an improved delivery system. Similarly, the arguments that recourse to the
public sector, whether federal or state, can simply, easily or promptly solve the
monumental problems facing the health system is clearly overconfidence in our
present capacity.
A more realistic appraisal of the situation we face is that we must utilize
both the private and public sectors in the management of a nationwide health
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power flowing from payment of public monies, collection of personal
information, and other aspects of welfare is arguably decentralized to
a degree; and organizations working in the health care payment field
are given new business rather than being forced out by a federal take-
over.'3 ' Legally, there are simple mechanisms available to extend con-
straints on the misuse of identifiable records to all of the public and
private entities involved in administering the programs.' 2 Yet, there
may still be some risks in this tendency. As more organizations take
part in running or using the systems, lines of authority may become at-
tenuated or blurred, and responsibility difficult to pinpoint. Despite
the unity of formal requirements, different organizations may have dif-
ferent perspectives on what information practices are permissible or
desirable, and different kinds of interests to protect. And symbiotic re-
lationships between government agencies and private contractors may
be unusually threatening in this area because of the large amounts of
personal information involved. Recent charges that one of the major
data processing contractors for Medicare Part B used improper influ-
ence to obtain contracts, made illegal political campaign contributions,
and engaged in generally slipshod performance of data processing opera-
tions,133 are merely suggestive of the kinds of advantages a corrupt
system; we must utilize federal, state, and local agencies; we must seek and
obtain full and appropriate participation of all providers of services and the
consumers of services ....
Id.
131. Wilbur Cohen, who was a high-ranking official in the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare at the time the original Medicare legislation was passed, described
the kind of compromises that were necessary in recent congressional testimony:
We are using 80 intermediaries now in the program. If you will recall,
Mr. Chairman, I had to promise you and Mr. Watts in the executive session
in 1965 that I would, as the administrator of the program, fairly utilize a wide
variety of fiscal intermediaries....
Now, after 7 or 8 years, we don't need 80 intermediaries to run the pro-
gram. We could run it with the 9 or 10 who are most efficient.
Hearings on National Health Insurance Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 7, at 2765 (1974).
132. The Office of General Counsel of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare has taken the position that the statutes and regulations governing confidcn-
tiality of personal information are applicable to nonfederal instrumentalities involved in
the administration of these programs. In addition, the Department has a standard clause
in its contracts which requires subcontractors to agree to abide by the applicable regu-
lations. Hearings on Federal Information Systems, pt. 2, at 306-07 (letter from Gerald
C. Altman, Jr., Acting Assistant General Counsel, Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, to William S. Moorhead, Chairman, Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and
Government Information, House Comm. on Government Operations). See also W.
Rubinstein, supra note 129.
133. See generally Kelly, It May Not Be Illegal . . . But Is It Professional, COm-
PUTMWORLD, Aug. 22, 1973, at 11; Tracy, The Poverty 'Billionaire Comes Calling on
Rocky, The Village Voice, July 12, 1973, at 1, col. 4; Hearings on Administration of
(Vol. 25
COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL RECORDS
contractor could seek by exploiting its unique position and its mas-
sive store of personal records.
A final clear trend in third-party payment is the steady expansion
of benefits and beneficiaries resulting from the growing governmental
presence in the health care field. Apart from the simple growth in
medical data processing systems that this expansion implies, there is
also the possibility that it could produce widespread changes in offi-
cial attitudes toward the privacy of medical information. As publicly
funded health care becomes ubiquitous, everyone becomes a kind of
welfare recipient-and thus joins a group whose privacy has tradi-
tionally been readily sacrificed to administrative convenience and pres-
sures for public accountability. 134 As computer-assisted techniques are
developed to improve accountability in the government-financed pro-
grams-by automatically screening patient records to find patterns and
instances of abnormal costs, or unnecessary or unsuccessful treatments,
or aberrant patterns of utilization-it becomes apparent that these
devices can also be applied to the diminishing segment of health care
which is privately financed. Thus, some commentators have argued
that licensing of physicians and other health care providers should be
supplanted by a system of "output monitoring" patterned on the qual-
ity control approaches developed for public health care programs,
and built upon a large-scale computer network. 35
Although public funding inevitably implies some form of public
accountability to minimize waste or misappropriation, it remains un-
clear how much of this function can be achieved with unidentifiable
statistical aggregates rather than identified patient records. Conceivably,
development of a more universal system of public funding might ease
some of the pressures to collect identifiable records. When health bene-
fits are narrowly limited or "targeted"-to particular groups, to cer-
tain types of providers, to given levels of cost, or even to specified
diseases-it becomes necessary to gather and evaluate sufficient med-
ical, financial and personal data to assure that the complex eligibility
Federal Health Benefit Programs Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pts. 3-4 (1971-72).
134. See generally Handler & Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance
and Juvenile Justice, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 377 (1966); cf. Handler & Hollings-
worth, Stigma, Privacy and Other Attitudes of Welfare Recipients, 22 STAN. L. REv.
1 (1969).
135. Tancredi & Woods, The Social Control of Medical Practle: Licensure Versus
Output Monitoring, 50 MmLBANK. MEmORIuL FuND Q. 99 (1972).
136. Cf. Hearings on Administration of Federal Health Benefit Programs Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
3, at 169 (1971). The following is testimony of Robert Mayne, Deputy Director of Pro-
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criteria have been met. Simplified eligibility standards could make it
possible to reduce this data collecton burden.180 Similarly, replace-
ment of the present patchwork of separate and parallel programs with
a unified apparatus for dispensing benefits could reduce the pressure
to use computers as surveillance devices which can track down indi-
viduals who are "overutilizing" the health care system. 137 However,
efforts to make such large-scale structural changes in health care de-
livery systems inevitably raise a host of controversial practical and po-
litical issues, and it seems unlikely that privacy considerations could
play more than a marginal role in shaping public funding programs.
Perhaps for this reason, efforts to protect medical privacy have tended
to focus on legal and administrative devices to control the behavior of
those who operate the systems, rather than the underlying justifica-
tions for collecting the data in the first place.
II. PRIVILEGE AND PRIVACY: THE ESTABLISHED
LEGAL CONTROLS
Traditionally, legal controls for the confidentiality of medical in-
formation can be divided into two conceptual categories: evidentiary
privileges for communications between doctor and patient, and tort
actions for invasion of privacy. In theory these two areas of law are
gram Operations, Bureau of Health Insurance, Social Security Administration before the
Subcommittee:
The point of the system to be employed is . . . an everchanging consideration
dependent upon changes in the law. What is required of the system, now under
the medicare law as a primary part of the operation, is the reasonable charge
determination, because of the requirements on how reasonable charge is to be
made. A simple change in the law, if Congress were to do this, would make a
complete difference in the system. It would wipe out two-thirds of the EDP
system operation as such.
Id.
137. See, e.g., The Washington Post, Aug. 12, 1974, at C-1, col. 3, where it reads:
District [of Columbia] and Maryland welfare officials, under federal pres-
sure to reduce welfare cheating, are discussing an agreement under which they
would exchange information telling welfare authorities about outside income
being received improperly and secretly from out of state by persons on public
assistance.
"One of the most important causes of error in maryland [sic] is unreported
earnings," [a state official] said . . . . "A lot is attributable to unreported
earnings in the District"....
"Basically," he said, the exchange of information entails "cross referencing
social security numbers" of welfare recipients against earning statements filed




complementary, since pri'vilege statutes are designed to govern disclo-
sures in some official forum such as a court or legislature, while privacy
actions are designed to deal with disclosures to the general public. In
practice, however, privacy and privilege doctrines are largely irrele-
vant to the problems posed by modern computerized medical informa-
tion systems, and they are both subject to abuse by organizations that
are bent on collecting and using identifiable medical records.
At the threshold, traditional privacy and privilege doctrines suffer
from the common disability of being creatures of diverse state statu-
tory or common law provisions rather than uniform national stand-
ards. As a result, they are extremely difficult to apply to a technology
that frequently is part of multistate or multinational communications
networks. A medical information system like the MIB or MSIS that
transmits personal data across state lines for storage or processing, and
then moves it back to the point of origin or to some other destination
for end use or retransmission, poses obvious problems as to which state's
law should apply when there is a challenge to the propriety of a par-
ticular use or disclosure. In addition to these relatively straightforward
conflicts, gaps, and inconsistencies, there remain difficult problems of
federalism when the record system reflects a mix of federal, state and
private interests. If a medical information system is owned and oper-
ated by the federal government and is integral to the functioning of
a health care program that is wholly supported by federal funds, it
seems reasonable enough to make the federal statutes and regulations
relating to confidentiality preemptive of state law. If, on the other
hand, the federal government requires a proportional funding con-
tribution from the State of New York to support a health care program
for New York citizens which is administered by a private carrier that
is located in Illinois but has a data processing subcontract with a
Texas corporation whose computers are continually in communication
with federal computers in Maryland, it is difficult to say, as a general
matter, whether federal or state interests are predominant, or indeed
which states' interests ought to be taken into account. Beyond these
systemic difficulties, however, the existing state-created laws of privacy
and privilege have substantive shortcomings which can make them
more effective as a shield for system operators than as a safeguard for
data subjects.
A. The Doctor-Patient Privilege
The rule that confidential communications. from a patient to his
doctor during the course of treatment are inadmissible in judicial
1 975],
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proceedings did not exist at common law, -and does not exist today
in a significant minority of states where there is no statute creating
the privilege. 18 The doctor-patient privilege has been repeatedly criti-
cized by leading commentators on the law of evidence, on the ground
that it interferes unduly with the truth-seeking functions of courts and
other tribunals, and attempts to expand the privilege frequently en-
counter strong opposition for this reason.18
Even when a doctor-patient privilege does exist, it may be so nar-
rowly confined as to be of little value to an individual seeking to pre-
vent disclosure of his medical records. If the body seeking the records
is legislative or administrative rather than judicial, the patient may
not be protected at all by the privilege statute:
The status of the privilege in proceedings before state legislative
and administrative committees is uncertain. Several statutes are, in
terms, limited to judicial proceedings, while the others contain lan-
guage prohibiting certain disclosures without defining the locus in
which the prohibition is to take effect....
As in the case of Congressional committees, there is apparently
no way of forcing federal administrative agencies to recognize the
privilege. 140
Once it is established that there is a privilege statute applicable
to the forum where a controversy is pending,' 41 the party asserting the
138. See, e.g., J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 256 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as J. WALTZ & F. INBAU].
139. See, e.g., Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is justice Served Or Ob-
structed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L. J. 607
(1943); Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstruction to Expert Testimony by Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. Cr. L. REv. 285, 290-92 (1943). J. WALTZ & F. INBAU at 253 con-
clude:
A death knell for the general physician-patient privilege has been sounded.
The law is on the verge of letting medical truth-and all of it-be known in
the courtroom ....
140. Note, Legal Protection of the Confidential Nature of the Physician-Patient
Relationship, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 384, 388-90 (1952).
A case that is frequently cited for the proposition that state legislative committees
are subject to the privilege is New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31
N.E.2d 31 (1940). There, the court relied upon a privilege statute to deny enforcement
of a subpoena duces tecum which sought access to hospital patient records as part of a
City Council investigation of negligence and maladministration in the treatment of
patients. However, the holding may be limited to the particular factual setting. See
Note, supra, at 389.
141. It remains an open question whether federal courts are constitutionally re-
quired under the Erie doctrine to follow the privilege rules of the states. The new
Federal Rules of Evidence as approved by the Supreme Court would have created federal
rules of privilege, but this aspect of the Rules was changed by the Congress. See gen-
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privilege will still have to meet the conditions specified by the statute.
Four kinds of requirements are common in privilege legislation: the
professional status of the party testifying; the existence of a physician-
patient relationship; the nature of the communication or information
in question; and the necessity of the communication to treatment.14
Each of these conditions may cause problems in the context of con-
temporary medical practice.
Often privilege statutes apply only to physicians, surgeons and
other narrowly defined categories of medical personnel. Thus, if med-
ical data are gathered by someone whose title does not fit the statutory
categories, such as a member of a hospital administrative staff or a
welfare intake worker, the privilege may not be effective in some
states. 143 Similarly, communications made in the course of treatment
by "helping professionals" other than physicians-psychologists, social
workers, family counselors, and the like-may be unprivileged, 144 even
though the mental or emotional problems being treated generate far
more sensitive information than routine medical care. The existence
of a privilege may also be questionable when information generated
by a treating physician is placed in the hands of third-party custodians
such as hospital record administrators or independent data systems like
the MSIS. 145 Since these categories of record-keepers are unlikely to be
mentioned in the privilege statute, the issue of disclosure may turn
on whether the record custodian can be termed an agent of the doctor
under relevant state law.
erally Anderton, The Constitutional and Erie Implications for Federal Diversity Cases
of the Privilege Provisions of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 8 LINCOLN L. REv.
151 (1973); Santarelli, The Supreme Court's Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: The
Authority and Necessity for Codification in Retrospect, 32 FED. BAR J. 257, 264-69
(1973); Pub. L. No. 93-595, Rule 501 (Jan. 2, 1975).
142. Note, supra note 140, at 390-91.
143. See J. WALTz & F. INBAU at 243, where they state:
To the extent that hospital records include confidential information sup-
plied by a patient to his physician and the physician's diagnostic findings,
they too are privileged. Some courts, believing that privilege statutes should be
narrowly construed because of their truth-frustrating attributes, do not extend
the privilege to information obtained and recorded by someone other than a
physician.
144. See, e.g., Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Profes-
sionals: Its Implication for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.
J. 1226, 1254-1260 (1962). A few states have enacted psychotherapist-patient privileges.
See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CoDE §§ 1010-1026 (West 1966).
145. During the development of the Multistate Information System for Psychiatric
Patient Records, discussed in note 34 supra, doubts about the applicability of the
privilege were resolved by enactment of a special statute in New York, the state where
the computer files were kept, providing that records in MSIS. were immune from sub-
poena. Curran, Laska, Kaplan & Bank, Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality, SCIENCE,
Nov. 23 1973, at 797, 799-800.
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Other technical defects sufficient to defeat the privilege occasionally
arise from a failure to establish a true doctor-patient relationship, or
from the fact that the information in question was not deemed neces-
sary for medical treatment. Thus, it has been held that "since the rela-
tion between a patient committed to a mental institution and the offi-
cial in charge of that institution is not the professional relation con-
templated by statute," the privilege was not applicable.14 "Treatment
purposes" may be defined to exclude many common situations in which
sensitive data is collected, such as pre-employment or pre-insurance
medical examinations, 47 as well as less normal occurrences like attempts
to obtain narcotics or other treatment illegally.148 Finally, the patient
can waive the protections of the privilege, and frequently is forced
to do so either by an express contract clause in insurance policies 140 or
by implication when he brings an action to recover for personal inju-
ries.150 Since waiver verges into the problem of the consent defense
to an invasion of privacy claim, the two principles will be discussed
together in the following section. As will be seen, the easy potential
for abuse of the waiver principle, like other doctrinal shortcomings in
the doctor-patient privilege, is in large measure attributable to the
law's implicit assumption that the dominant mode for delivering med-
ical services will be the individual physician or the small clinic. Con-
sequently, the doctrines fail to take account of the ways in which the
recent bureaucratization has affected medical record-keeping. Trends
toward the paraprofessionalization of health care, the separation of
record-keeping from the doctor's direct control and supervision, the
growing utility of medical records for purposes beyond treatment of
the data subject, and the individual's powerlessness and unequal bar-
gaining power in comparison to the large, impersonal institutions
which make demands for access to his records, all tend to shift the
146. Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 776, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915, 918 (Sup. Ct.
1944). It may be significant that the data subject in this case was trying to recover
damages from the superintendent of the state hospital for the mentally ill for disclosing
privileged records, rather than simply asserting the privilege to block testimony. J. Waltz
& F. Inbau note that "the majority of jurisdictions hold that the fact that the afflicted
person is a patient in a public institution, such as a hospital for the insane or men-
tally ill, does not strip him of the physician-patient privilege." J. WALTZ & F. IN13AU at
241.
147. J. WALTZ & F. INBAU at 239.
148. Id. at 242. As further examples, the authors state: "The privilege would un-
doubtedly be held inapplicable to a fugitive who sought to have a police-inflicted gun-
shot wound treated or to have his appearance altered through plastic surgery." Id.
149. "Except in a minority of states, Michigan being the most important, the
courts give effect to an express waiver of the doctor-patient privilege contained in
applications for health or life insurance or in the policy itself." Id. at 245-46.
150. See id. at 247, 249.
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focus away from the traditional courtroom confrontation in which the
patient can rely on relatively clear legal principles and the medical
profession's strong ethical tradition of confidentiality to block damag-
ing disclosures.
B. Invasion of Privacy Actions
Unlike the doctor-patient privilege, statutory or common-law
causes of action for invasion of privacy were not formulated with the
specific objective of regulating disclosures of medical information. As
a result, the relevance of the legal principles to the realities of medical
record use and abuse frequently is rather tenuous. Among the four
general categories of common-law actions for invasion of privacy, 15'
only one, public disclosure of private facts, seems reasonably applicable
to the abuses that are likely to arise in modern medical record sys-
tems. 5 2 "Public disclosure" generally has meant widespread dissemina-
tion of the information, if not mass media publicity, 5 3 and the few
reported cases involving medical information, seem to arise out of
sensationalized reports of freakish maladies,' 54 or medical case his-
tory studies in which the researcher has failed to conceal the subject's
identity.155 In contrast to these unusual situations, the threatening
151. The four categories are intrusion upon an individual's seclusion, appropriation
of a person's name or likeness, unreasonable publicity for private facts, and publicity
which places the individual in a "false light" in the public eye. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1965); W. PROSSER, TORTS, § 112 (4th ed. 1971);
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 392-93 (1960).
152. Cf. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New
Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MicH. L. REv, 1089, 1156-58
(1969).
153. Id. at 1157:
[Bjefore an injured party can recover for a public disclosure of private facts
... he must show that the private information was given "publicity," or that it
was communicated to the public at large. By way of contrast, a plaintiff in an
action for defamation need show only that the derogatory statement in question
was "published"-that the defendant communicated it to a third party. A few
exceptions to the mass publication requirement for privacy actions have been
recognized, most of them involving instances in which "the information was
gained by wrongful prying or ... its communication involves a breach of con-
fidence or the violation of an independent duty."
154. See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); Baze-
more v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
155. E.g., Griffin v. Medical Society of the State of New York, 7 Misc. 2d 549,
11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1939). An unusual recent example of the failure to conceal
the identity of a patient in a medical history report is Doe v. Roe, 42 App. Div. 2d 559,
345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Ist Dep't), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 902, 307 N.E.2d 823, 352 N.Y.S.2d
626, motion to amend remittitur granted, 34 N.Y.2d 562, 310 N.E.2d 539, 354
N.Y.S.2d 941 (1973), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 95 S. Ct. 1154 (1975).
There, a psychotherapist published a book about a patient and her family, based on
intimate revelations made during seven years of psychotherapy. Plaintiff claimed that
anyone who knew the family could easily identify them in the book.
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disclosures in modern medical record-keeping are likely to be low-
visibility transactions-transferring identifiable records from one com-
puter operator to another under the "buddy system,"'5 6 or permitting
an investigator to search the files without proper authorization,' or
releasing information to an employer, credit grantor, or acquaintance
of the data subject. 58 In these situations, the concerns for first amend-
ment freedom of the press that have dominated the "public disclosure
of private fact" cases are largely absent; the interest in promoting de-
bate or issues of public importance is at least tangential when the
156. Professors Westin and Baker, after studying a number of computer systems
handling personal information, concluded that "computerization has not halted the in-
formal or 'buddy system' exchanges that existed in the manual era, and may even have
increased their volume in some cases." WESTIN & BAKER at 255. A survey of the prac-
tices of selected federal agencies relating to sharing of personal information concluded:
The "common law" of interagency transfers of information that obtains in
agencies that have no regulations governing their information-and indeed, in
a fair number of agencies that do-seems to be that if a "responsible" member
of one agency makes a request-preferably, but not invariably, in writing-for
particular information about an individual or business entity to a person in
another agency who has access to the information, and if the party who re-
quests the information states his reasons for needing it-often no more than
a bare statement that he wants it for undisclosed "official purposes"-then the
transfer of information will be made with no further ado. Generally no inquiry
is made into the authority of the requesting agency to gather the information
sought, and none is cited beyond perhaps a bare statement of "need." The re-
questing agency usually does not inquire and is not told about the confiden-
tiality restrictions, if any, under which the information is held ....
A. Bell, Interagency Transfers of Information in Individually Identifiable Form 17
(Report prepared for the Committee on Rulemaking and Public Information of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, Sept. 10, 1973).
157. Cf. Miller, supra note 152, at 1149; WESTIN & BAKER at 148.
158. See, e.g., E. SPRINGER, AUTOMATED MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAv 14-15
(1971), which reads:
There is the story of a young career woman employed by a ... company
which gave all its key employees free annual medical examinations. During her
routine physical examination she mentioned in passing that she had been under-
going psychoanalysis for several years. The woman refused to discuss the matter
further but was badgered into accounting all the details because the examining
physician insisted that it was impossible for him to complete his medical ex-
amination without this information. She was assured that the information would,
of course, be kept private. Within two weeks, her immediate supervisor knew of
the details and within three, all of her co-workers.
Other companies have major medical plans which reimburse the employee
for medical and prescription drug bills. However, it is usually necessary to
obtain complete statements of all visits to physicians and all pharmaceutical
bills. ... These are not filed with the insurance company, but rather with the
corporations themselves which in turn forward the claims. Token pretense is
made of information privacy by mailing the forms in sealed envelopes.
See also Joint Hearings on Privacy Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Privacy and In-
formation Systems of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 1039-40 (1974) ; Note 188 infra.
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information is dispersed through an elite rather than a mass medium,
and the data is of little or no general interest. 59
The difficulty of fitting many kinds of medical data disclosures
into the traditional privacy categories may have given rise to the mis-
cellany of alternative theories that occasionaly appear when invasion-
of-privacy claims are brought against doctors. Damage actions have
been based upon an obligation to be silent that is implied in the con-
tract between physician and patient, 60 a fiduciary duty imposed on
the doctor as a result of his power over the patient,' 61 and implied
rights of private action under licensing or testimonial privilege
statutes. 62 More ingenious litigants have ranged farther afield, basing
actions for unauthorized disclosure of medical records on the theory
that the disclosure was a commercial exploitation of the patient's name
or likeness,1 3 or a prima facie tort,'M or malpractice. 6 5 Commentators
have added to the confusion by suggesting that a new breach of privacy
159. Due to the Supreme Court's dismissal of certiorari in the Roe v. Doe case,
the question of what constitutional standards are applicable to a "public disclosure of
private facts" case involving medical records remains open. Cf. Gertz v. Welch, 94 S.
Ct. 2997 (1974) (defamation action by private individual); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967) ("false light" invasion of privacy).
160. E.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965). In Hammonds, the court states the following:
Doctor and patient enter into a simple contract, the patient hoping he will be
cured and the doctor optimistically assuming that he will be compensated.
As an implied condition of that contract, this Court is of the opinion that the
doctor warrants that any confidential information gained through the relation-
ship will not be released without the patient's permission. Almost every mem-
ber of the public is aware of the promise of discretion contained in the Hippo-
cratic Oath, and every patient has a right to rely upon this warranty of silence.
The promise of secrecy is as much an express warranty as the advertisement of
a commercial entrepreneur. Consequently, when a doctor breaches his duty
of secrecy, he is in violation of part of his obligations under the contract.
Id. at 801. See also Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962).
161. Cf. Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962).
162. Cf. Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (Sup. Ct. 1960);
Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
163. In Griffin v. Medical Society of the State of New York, 7 Misc. 2d 549, 11
N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1939), plaintiff's physician took pictures of him before and
after treatment, and published them without consent in a medical journal article on
"The Saddle Nose." Plaintiff brought his action under the New York statutory provi-
sion which prohibits appropriation of a person's name or likeness for commercial pur-
poses. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948). The court reasoned that
the medical journal article might well be a form of commercial exploitation:
An article, even in a scientific publication, may be nothing more than some-
one's advertisement in disguise.. . .Publicity of a kind which is tantamount
to concealed or subtle advertising is sometimes freely given, or exchanged for
some immediate or remote benefit anticipated by the publisher.
7 Misc. 2d at 550, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
164. E.g., Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d 441, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
165. Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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tort be added to the established common-law categories: an action for
"breach of confidence" which "would be a recognition of the special
characteristics of secrecy in the physician-patient relationship."'",
Once a plaintiff succeeds in finding a plausible theory to fit his
claim, he still may find his recovery barred by one of the affirmative de-
fenses (confusingly refered to as "privileges") that have developed in
the law of privacy.167 Courts have recognized that other health-care pro-
fessionals have a qualified right0 8 to disclose sensitive information to
individuals and organizations having a reasonable "need to know":
those who might be infected by the data subject's contagious disease,00
or the patient's spouse,170 or the staff of a school where the patient is
enrolled,17' or those who need the information to protect the national
security.' 72 In addition, the patient's consent, whether explicitly given
166. Note, Action for Breach of Medical Secrecy Outside the Courtroom, 36 U.
CIN. L. REv. 103, 108 (1967).
167. See generally Miller, supra note 152, at 1160-62.
168. The qualified privilege can be lost if it is exercised unreasonably or in bad
faith. See id. In the present context, the privilege will generally be referred to as an af-
firmative defense in order to avoid confusion with the doctor-patient testimonial privi-
lege.
169. E.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (physician
told patient's landlady that he had a contagious disease, and that she should disinfect
his bedclothes; court held that patient could not recover under statute providing that
"betrayal of a professional secret to the detriment of a patient" was unprofessional
conduct).
170. In Curry v. Corn, 52 Misc. 2d 1035, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 1966), the
wife brought an action against her doctor for revealing information to her husband "with
the intent and expectation" that the husband would use this information against her in
a pending divorce action. The court held that such a disclosure was not actionable: "As
a prospective husband or wife is entitled to know before marriage whether his or her
future spouse is suffering from a diseased condition . . . it would appear to follow that
during marriage each has the right to know the existence of any disease which may have
a bearing on the marital relation." 52 Misc. 2d at 1037, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 471; cf. Berry
v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
171. Iverson v. Frandsen, 237 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1956), was brought as a
defamation action rather than an invasion of privacy claim, but it illustrates the serious
abuses that can be immunized by this kind of affirmative defense. The plaintiff, a young
child, was treated at a state mental hospital for claustrophobia, and while under treat-
ment she was given a standard test by a staff psychologist which was interpreted as in-
dicating that she was "at the high-grade moron level of general ability." 237 F.2d at 900.
Subsequently the psychologist's report was forwarded to the guidance counsellor at her
school, and "[lt was from this source that embarrassing rumors apparently emanated con-
cerning the mental condition of appellant." Id. The court held that the plaintiff had
failed to show actual malice on the part of the psychologist, which was necessary to de-
feat the qualified privilege. "It was a professional report made by a public servant in
good faith representing his best judgment, and therefore could not be maliciously false."
Id.




or implied from the factual circumstances, 173 is generally regarded as
a valid defense to an invasion of privacy claim.1 4 Since the reported
medical privacy cases have little useful discussion of the consent princi-
ple, commentators often rely on the analogous body of doctrine de-
veloped to deal with the question of whether a patient has given in-
formed consent to medical treatment. 75
Despite some contentions that the concept of "informed consent"
to treatment is confusing and lacks content, 76 it is widely understood
that the patient's valid consent must be premised on two factors: suffi-
cient information about risks and benefits to permit an intelligent
choice, and freedom to choose without coercion.17 Recent cases and
commentaries suggest a growing skepticism as to whether either of
these two conditions is usually satisfied in the routine transactions that
comprise the doctor-patient relationship. The duty to disclose risks,
which traditionally was based upon deference to the physician's dis-
cretion and the prevailing standard of practice within the medical
community,1 8 has been recast in a few recent decisions to require dis-
173. See, e.g., Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. RIv.
943, 952-53 (1959), which reads:
[C]onsent will be implied to any privacy invasion that the patient can
reasonably expect to be necessary for proper diagnosis or treatment of his
case. For example, by consulting a doctor, the patient impliedly consents to the
doctor's keeping ordinary medical records of the patient's case, and to the
customary and foreseeable use of these records.
174. See generally Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge
of a New Technology in an Information Oriented Society, 67 MicH. L. REv. 1089, 1170-73
(1969).
175. E.g., J. WALTZ & F. INBAU at 278 (principles relating to informed consent to
therapy are "broadly applicable" to consent to invasion of privacy); cf. Note, Medical
Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REv. 943, 952-53 (1959).
176. See, e.g., J. WALTZ & F. INBAu at 152 (informed consent is "another of those
expressions, current in the medical-legal lexicon, that may possess more felicity than
content"); Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. Rzv. 639 (1968)
(informed consent an "unfortunate journalistic expression [which] has caused confusion").
Part of this confusion undoubtedly resulted from frequent failure to make the distinc-
tion between the two major theories of recovery for unauthorized treatment, malprac-
tice and battery, and to this extent the confusion would not be cause for concern in the
privacy context. See generally Plante, supra.
177. J. WALTZ & F. INBAu at 156.
178. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957); Kesserick & Mankin, Medical Malpractice:
The Right To Be Informed, 8 U. SAN FRANCISco L. RaV. 261, 267-68 (1973); Plante,
supra note 151, at 658. This policy was premised on the belief that "much of the risk
[is] of a technical nature beyond the patient's understanding." Roberts v. Wood, 206 F.
Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962). It was also premised on the belief that disclosure of
all risks, however remote, "may well result in unduly alarming the patient, who is al-
ready apprehensive, fearful and dejected." Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical
Treatment, II CLEV.-MAR. L. REy. 249, 251 (1962). Patient fear, in turn, might "ac-
tually increas[e] the risks by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension itself."
154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181 (1957). Consequently, "good medical practice,"
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closure of "all information relevant to a meaningful decisional pro-
cess."'179 The rationale of these recent decisions-the fact that the pa-
tient's reliance on the doctor for relevant information is "well-nigh
abject,"'180 and the likelihood that a standard based on prevailing med-
ical practices would provide little or no protection for the patient' 8 1 -
seems equally applicable to privacy questions. At the same time, full
disclosure of privacy risks associated with possible uses of his medical
records should pose no threat to the patient's well-being. As a practical
matter, however, it is doubtful whether the full-disclosure-of-risks.
notion is a useful approach to privacy questions. When patient data is
collected, privacy-threatening future uses may be unforeseen or unfore-
seeable; the doctor or paraprofessional who deals with the patient may
be so little involved in the details of record-keeping or the privacy issue
that he would not be aware of even the obvious risks; and the patient
faced with a serious health problem will generally not be able to mo-
bilize much attention for privacy problems. More important, it is diffi-
cult to imagine many situations in which a patient really has much of a
choice as to whether he should give out or authorize later disclosures
of particular items of information.
The general rule, at least in the consent-to-treatment situation, is
that individuals who are of sound mind and sufficient age are rebuttably
presumed to be qualified to give or withhold consent. 182 Yet, there is
some empirical evidence that, even in the best of circumstances, 183 pa-
measured by a professional community standard, was the test for disclosure of risks.
See Kessenick & Mankin, supra, at 267-70.
179. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513
(1972) (en banc).
180. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Because of this
dependent position of the patient, the court reasoned, the law "exacted obligations be-
yond those associated with arms-length transactions." Id. The court left open the possi-
bility that "sound medical judgment" would justify nondisclosure of risks in particular
situations. Id. at 789. But the general tenor of the opinion suggests that such claims
would be carefully and skeptically scrutinized. See also Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App.
3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969).
181. See Canterbury v. Spence, where the court stated:
[T]o bind the disclosure to medical usage is to arrogate the decision on revela-
tion to the physician alone. Respect for the patient's right of self-determina-
tion on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians
rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.
464 F.2d at 784.
182. J. WALTZ & F. INBAu at 169. The authors note that the presumption "falls
away in the face of evidence that the person was delirious or comatose, intoxicated,
under the influence of drugs, or otherwise incapable of exercising rational judgement."
Id.
183. The study that highlighted these problems of the voluntariness of informed
consent took place in a major university medical center, with peer review committees
to assure that proper consent procedures were followed. Bradford H. Gray, Human Ex-
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tients' freedom of choice will be overborne by their emotional need to
place absolute reliance on their doctors' recommendations,18 4 or their
reluctance to question the judgment of a high-status professional. 8 5 In
one recent study, researchers concluded that about half of the members
of a group of women who had volunteered to take an experimental drug
during childbirth had not given full and free consent. s6 If patients are
unable to exercise independent judgment on matters that so directly
and immediately affect their physical well-being, there seems to be
little chance that they could act autonomously regarding collateral mat-
ters of information use.
Frequently, of course, the patient will also be under overwhelming
economic pressure to give whatever consent might be requested. In the
field of third-party payment, the general practice seems to favor use of
broadly-worded authorizations that provide maximum convenience for
the paying organization, and virtually no protection for the patient. A
claim form used in the New York statewide employees' health insurance
program requires the claimant to sign a statement saying "I hereby
authorize any Insurance Company, Organization, Employer, Hospital,
Physician, Surgeon, or Pharmacist to release any information requested
with respect to this claim and the attached bills."' 87 The standard form
reportedly used in the New York no-fault program is at least as broad,
providing that "[t]his authorization, or photocopy hereof, will authorize
you to furnish all information you may have regarding my condition
perimentation in Medical Research: A Sociological Study 37 (unpublished Ph. D. dis-
sertation, Yale University, 1973, now published as HUMAN SUBJECTS IN MEDICAL Ex-
PERIMENTATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE CONDUCT AND REGULATION OF CLIN-
ICAL RESEARCH (1975)). The experimenters required a written consent, and they "be-
lieved in the ethical validity of the principle of informed consent." Id. at 232.
184. See id. at 129, where it was noted that "the striking thing about subjects'
responses was the extent to which they reflected faith and trust in physicians, even to
the point where assumptions of no risk were made when apparently no knowledge was
present." One inference drawn from these findings was that "many people apparently
cannot conceive of a physician in a nontherapeutic role" and consequently they will
assume that anything a physician wants them to do is for their own benefit. Id. at 228.
See also id. at 234.
185. The indigent clinic patients included in the study group, who were treated
by different doctors at various times and had not established a personal relationship with
any physician, were unwilling to question what they thought was the doctor's recom-
mendation that they participate in the experiment because they were apparently in-
timidated by the "wide status gulf between them and the physicians." Id. at 243-44.
186. Of the patients participating in the experiments, 39 percent did not under-
stand that they were taking part in an experiment; 8 percent felt that they had been
coerced into participating; and another 6 percent were indifferent to their own involve-
ment in the experiment or gave no reason other than the belief that their doctors wanted
them to take the drug. Id. at 142.
187. Copy available in the files of the Buffalo Law Review.
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which under your observation or treatment, including the history ob-
tained, x-ray and physical findings, diagnosis and prognosis."' ls
With this type of open-ended consent, the only realistic safeguard
for the patient seems to be the third-party payer's good faith or possible
lack of interest in irrelevant data. 8 9 For most people, foregoing cover-
age and personally absorbing the cost of a major episode of illness is
simply not a plausible alternative. And it is not only the private in-
surers, but government agencies as well, that have sought protection or
justification in the consent principle. As a Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare document puts it,
Social Security Act beneficiaries, by analogy to a contractual waiver
of the physician-patient privilege, have agreed to a waiver within the
limited confines of the Social Security Act. Accordingly, Medicare,
Medicaid, and Maternal and Child Health beneficiaries have permitted
a waiver of the privilege for the purposes of peer, utilization, carrier,
and PSRO review of their medical records, not to mention Social Se-
curity audits of those records.190
To be sure, there is nothing unreasonable in requiring a beneficiary of
a public or private health care program to provide sufficient data to
demonstrate that he is properly entitled to compensation. The problem
is that the leverage resulting from the patient's economic dependency
can easily be used to extract unduly broad authorizations which purport
to immunize any collection, storage or disclosure practices that the third-
party payer may decide to adopt. When the consent principle is used in
188. Copy available in the files of the Buffalo Law Review (emphasis added).
189. In some situations, notably work-related health insurance programs, there have
been reports of widespread abuse. See M. Grossman, Factors Concerning Consent Form
Authorizing Release of Medical Information for Insurance Reports (1974) (unpublished
background paper for the Conference on Confidentiality of Health Records; copy avail-
able in the files of the Buffalo Law Review). This paper states:
Numerous . . . patients, not being told of their official diagnosis for one
reason or another, get word of it through outside channels. In most cases, it is
from fellow employees who receive the information from personnel office em-
ployees, after the insurance company sent the information back to the employer.
In other cases, the employees themselves have been told by the employers ....
In some cases, they received information about this when credit bureau in-
vestigators began asking neighbors what they know about the patient-claimant's
treatment or hospitalization. In one case, the insurance company assigned the
consent form to a credit bureau to act as their agent in reviewing a physi-
cian's records.
Id. at 1.
190. Office of Professional Standards Review of U.S. Department of Health, Edu-




this fashion, it becomes little more than a device "to place responsibil-
ity for invasions of privacy on the victim."'191
C. Public Law and Medical Privacy
The obvious artificiality of applying consent principles based on
an implicit model of arm's-length bargaining between relatively equal
parties to relationships between welfare recipients and the massive HEW
bureaucracy suggests that public law approaches may be more appro-
priate for many privacy issues. Unfortunately, the general trend of rele-
vant legal doctrine seems to have been legitimation of government's
growing appetite for personal medical records, with fairly minimal safe-
guards or opportunities for public participation in relevant agency de-
cisions. Only recently have there been serious efforts to re-examine
and improve the laws affecting government information practices.
As direct government involvement in health care and disease pre-
yention grew, the developing public law absorbed the private law no-
tion that doctors should be protected in divulging confidential medical
information to those directly concerned, such as individuals who were
exposed to contagious diseases.192 Early statutes, following this rationale,
carved out exceptions to the doctor-patient privilege by requiring physi-
cians to report to public health authorities simple matters such as com-
municable diseases or vital statistics relating to births and deaths. 93
Gradually reporting requirements were expanded to require reporting
of a great variety of medical conditions that are of interest to public
health authorities, such as cancer, 94 blindness, 95 gunshot or knife
wounds, 96 injuries inflicted with a deadly weapon,197 suspected cases of
child abuse,198 prescriptions of drugs and narcotics, 99 disorders that may
191. Miller, supra note 173, at 1172; cf. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60
Cal. 2d 92, 303 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (en banc).
192. See text accompanying notes 167-68 supra.
193. See J. WALTZ & F. INBAu~at 312.
194. E.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALT= LAW § 2401 (McKinney 1971); E. SPRINGER, supra
note 157, at 52.
195. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8704 (McKinney 1974).
196. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 1971).
197. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161 (West 1970).
198. See generally Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legis-
"lation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1967). Child abuse reporting laws frequently extend be-
yond physicians and health care professionals to include people with little or no medical
training such as teachers or school administrators, welfare or social workers, or even "any
person." See id. at 7. Obviously, the high risk of inaccuracy and stigma associated with
such reports would make them extremely dangerous to data subjects if improperly re-
leased.
199. See J. WALTZ & F. INBAU at 312.
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cause lapses of consciousness resulting in hazard to other motorists, 200
hearing impairments in children,20 1 and job-related injuries.20 2 In ad-
dition to these provisions for government collection of medical records
from private-sector health care providers,20 3 government is increasingly
involved in creating medical records directly. Welfare programs and
public clinics or hospitals are the most obvious government functions
that may generate medical data, but they do not complete the list: man-
datory screening programs, exemplified by the New York statute which
empowers public health officials to compel persons suspected of having
venereal disease to undergo a physical examination, 20 4 or the genetic
screening programs which seek to identify children who have heredi-
tary diseases like sickle-cell anemia, 205 are increasingly common. Once
identifiable medical records have passed into government hands,
whether state or federal, the privacy of data subjects has usually de-
pended upon a maze of ad hoc statutes and administrative regulations
which seem to be consistent only with respect to the broad discretion
that they give the recordkeepers to decide who will have access, and on
what terms.206
200. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 410 (West 1970).
201. See J. WALTZ & F. INBAu at 319.
202. CAL. LABOR CODE § 6407 (West 1971).
203. In addition to narrowly-drawn reporting requirements, there may be broad
grants of information-gathering authority to public health officials which would theoret-
ically enable them to collect private medical records in bulk. See, e.g., Curran, Stearns &
Kaplan, Privacy, Confidentiality and Other Legal Considerations in the Establishment of
a Centralized Health-Data System, 281 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 241 (1969), where a
state statute governing disclosure of hospital records is characterized as "a classic exam-
ple of obscure, overly complex legal drafting destroying all clarity in the law." Id. at
242-43:
The provision can be read to give to the courts and to the department head
(presumably, the Commissioner of Public Health) an unlimited power to
"order" inspection of hospital patient records. We cannot find evidence of the
use of this power by Commissioners of Public Health, present or past.... If
the provision is read liberally, however, it would allow the Commissioner to
order inspection of otherwise confidential patient records by anyone he desig-
nates and for any purpose he deems proper. For example, under such an inter-
pretation, the Commissioner could possibly order every hospital in the state
to allow inspection of its patient records and to allow copies to be made of
them. These copies might then be entered into a central health-data system.
to allow inspection of its patient records and to allow copies to be made of
them. There is nothing in the statute that would provide for confidentiality of
the data once released.
204. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2300 (McKinney 1971).
205. See generally Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The
Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 696, 703-05 (1973).
206. E.g., Meldman, Centralized Information Systems and the Legal Right to
Privacy, 52 MARQ. L. Rnv. 335 (1969). In his article Meldman indicates the following:
Almost all states have statutory provisions for the accessibility of official
records. These provisions are usually scattered throughout the statutes, . . .
As each governmental department or agency is created, provisions for the neces-
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One possible means of rationalizing and controlling government
,policies for handling sensitive personal information is development of
constitutional doctrines imposing minimum standards on government
information practices. However, the evolution of constitutional princi-
ples dealing with collection and dissemination of medical records or
similar personal data has been slow and cautious. Supreme Court de-
cisions recognizing a constitutional privacy right to be free from gov-
ernment interference in the areas of birth control207 and abortion208
raised the possibility that a general right to privacy for matters relating
to medical treatment might emerge,20 9 and restrict government power
to gather medical records. As yet this possibility remains largely un-
realized, as illustrated by two subsequent lower court cases in which
attempts to extract medical information were challenged on constitu-
tional grounds.
In the first case, Merriken v. Cressman,210 the challengers succeeded
sary record-gathering or bookkeeping are generally enacted at the same time.
The laws pertaining to access of these records therefore widely vary among the
different sets of records kept within a state. Most official records are established
as "public," which usually means that anyone may have access to them, but
certain more sensitive information, such as tax or health records, is defined as
"confidential." Various levels of confidentiality exist. Some information may be
available to any governmental body or to certain governmental bodies upon a
showing of a good reason for obtaining the information, or it may be unavail-
able to anyone outside the original record-gathering body. Quite often, however,
the accessibility of records is unclear in the statutory provisions, and questions
of accessibility are left up to the discretion of the keeper of the records.
Id. at 343. The 1973 survey of federal statutes and regulations discussed in A. Bell, supra
note 156, reached similar conclusions. As might be imagined, problems can arise in co-
operative federal-state welfare programs when the rules of the two jurisdictions treat
the same information differently. See, e.g., The Washington Post, July 11, 1975, at A7,
col. 1 (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare regulations requiring states
to keep confidential records identifying parents who have deserted their families in con-
flict with state statutes making the records public documents).
207. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
208. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
209. Perhaps the strongest statement in the Supreme Court opinions were the com-
ments in Justice Douglas' concurrence in Doe v. Bolton, relating to a state requirement
that a prospective abortion patient had to be examined by doctors other than her per-
sonal physician:
The right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the physician-
patient relationship, unless it be in the priest-penitent relationship.
It is one thing for a patient to agree that her physician may consult with
another physician about her case. It is quite a different matter for the State
compulsorily to impose on that physician-patient relationship another layer or,
as in this case, still a third layer of physicians. The right of privacy-the right
to care for one's health and person and to seek out a physician of one's own
choice protected by the Fourteenth Amendment-becomes only a matter of
theory, not a reality, when a multiple-physician-approval system is mandated by
the State.
410 U.S. at 219.
210. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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in blocking a school program which used psychological testing to iden-
tify eighth grade students who were "potential drug abusers," and com-
pulsory counseling to modify the behavior of those who were placed in
the high-risk group. As described by the court, the program seemed
almost designed to trample the privacy interests of the students: the
scientific validity of the theories on which the program was based was
questionable; 211 the qualifications of the people running the program
were dubious;2 2 the procedures used to obtain parental consent were
coercive and misleading;2 13 and the program designers were admittedly
compiling a "massive data bank" that would be generally accessi-
ble throughout the school bureaucracy.214 Although the program was
held unconstitutional, the grounds relied on by the court are suffi-
ciently narrow that the decision probably would not be a substantial
restraint on planners contemplating similar programs, much less pro-
grams which involve different kinds of medical information. Instead of
focusing on the medical nature of the intimate data being extracted
from the students, the court emphasized that the items on the question-
naire probing family relationships violated a constitutionally protected
family privacy interest.215 Thus, the decision may not be applicable
to government data-gathering activities that do not directly affect
a family interest.216 Moreover, the court found that this interest
was threatened primarily because the parental consent was invalid-
and in the process suggested that the conventional consent-to-medical-
treatment standards were constitutionally sufficient.217 Thus, slightly
211. See id. at 915-16.
212. Id. at 915.
213. In addition to a general overemphasis on benefits and failure to mention risks,
the disclosures made to parents offered assurances of confidentiality when in fact there
was "absolutely no assurance that the materials which have been gathered would be free
from access by outside authorities in the community who have subpoena power." Id. at
916. Coercion arose from a "negative option" scheme in which parents who did not want
their children to participate had to take affirmative action to release them from the
testing. Id. at 914. It arose as well from stigmatizing of the student plaintiff "in which
fellow students accused him of being a drug user because his mother does not want
him to participate .... ." Id. at 915.
214. Id. at 916. Identified data was to be disseminated to "various school per-
sonnel, including superintendents, principals, guidance counselors, athletic coaches, so-
cial workers; PTA officers, and school board members." Id.
215. Id. at 918.
216. See Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy-Personality Test
Used by a School to Identify Potential Drug Users Without Informed Consent of
Parents Violates Student's and Parents Right of Privacy, 27 VAND. L. Rnv. 372, 379
(1974).
217. 364 F. Supp. at 920. The court endorsed use of the consent-to-treatment ap-
proach despite its earlier observation that "[t]he Supreme Court has indicated that in
civil cases as well as criminal cases the Court should indulge in every reasonable pre-
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better consent procedures, or statutory authority to extract data by com-
pulsory process, might protect a program from constitutional challenge.
The willingness of many courts to defer to legislative or admin-
istrative justifications for collecting personal information is illustrated
by the second recent privacy case, Schulman v. New York City Health &
Hosp. Corp.218 There, doctors and patients failed in an attempt to strike
down a city ordinance which required that abortion patients' names
and addresses be reported on a "termination of pregnancy" certificate
which was put into a central filing registry. After first concluding that
a challenge based on violation of the doctor-patient privilege was insub-
stantial because the privilege was already riddled with exceptions for
hospital, welfare, insurance, and public health purposes,2 19 the court
held that the constitutional privacy claim must fail because there was a
''compelling state interest" in requiring the identity of the abortion
patients. Among the rationales that the court found "compelling" were
the government's desire "to provide statistical information, presently
unavailable, as to the effect of multiple abortions on the same woman
and any other adverse effects that may occur due to abortion," and the
government's purpose "to offer public health counseling on adequate
preventive family planning measures as an alternative measure to re-
peated abortions as a means of birth control. '220
If statistical or advisory functions like these can be considered a
"compelling state interest" sufficient to overbalance the patients' privacy
rights, 221 then the constitutional check on government collection of
medical records seems minimal indeed. While the Supreme Court's re-
cent decisions have not been as closely on point for medical records col-
lection programs as these lower court cases, the opinions in the 1974
sumption against waiver of procedural due process and an individual's Constitutional
rights." Id. at 919.
218. 44 App. Div. 2d 482, 355 N.Y.S.2d 781 (lst Dep't 1974).
219. Id. at 483-85, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 783-84. The court also emphasized that the
New York City Health Code contained confidentiality provisions which limited disclo-
sure of the data. Id.
220. Id. at 485, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 784. Other "persuasive reasons" mentioned by
the court were:
to allow follow-up where complications or coma ensues; to enable public health
authorities to determine whether improper or unorthodox procedures were
used in an out-patient facility and whether further investigation or regulation
is required; . ..and to insure that women who test positive for an Rh nega-
tive factor, venereal disease, sickle cell anemia and other factors which may
affect the health of future children receive proper counseling and treatment.
221. It is possible to argue that, even under the Schulman decision, these govern-
ment interests standing alone would not be considered compelling. The relevant portion
of the opinion pulls together a variety of justifications advanced by the government. See
note 220 supra. It also makes no attempt to indicate what the relative weight of each
of these interests might be.
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California Bankers case,222 involving government access to private finan-
cial records, suggest that some members of the present court are quite
willing to avoid these kinds of constitutional issues, and defer to the
judgments of other branches of government regarding data-collection
needs, at least when a plausible law-enforcement justification can be
made.
Constitutional controls on the use of personal data after it has been
collected seem to be even more rudimentary. Apart from a few cases in
the District of Columbia Circuit dealing with criminal justice records,22 3
courts have been extremely reluctant to find that agency practices for
handling personal data created a cognizable injury to constitutional
rights, 22 4 unless the personal information was used to support an agency
determination about entitlement to benefits or liability to sanctions. 226
While it is possible that due process principles could be extended on a
case-by-case basis to deal with a great variety of government informa-
tion-handling practices, experience in a related area-development of
constitutional doctrines to protect free speech interests that might be
222. California Bankers' Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). The substance of
the decision is summarized as follows in Miller, supra note 4, at 72, 81:
[Justice Rehnquist, author of the plurality opinion] concluded that the record-
keeping requirements did not create an unreasonable burden on the banks so as
to violate due process; that the obligation to maintain the records, as opposed
to a requirement to turn them over to the government, was not an invasion
of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures; that the banks,
having no privilege against self-incrimination, could not raise that objection;
that the assertion the recordkeeping might be used by governmental investi-
gators to identify members of organizations in violation of the First Amend-
ment right of freedom of association was premature; that the Fourth Amend-
ment challenges to the reporting requirements failed because the statutory pur-
poses were reasonable and the depositor plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
the domestic reporting regulations; that the banks could not challenge the re-
porting requirements on the ground of self-incrimination and that the depositor
plaintiffs' similar attack on the reporting requirements was premature; and,
finally, that the ACLU's claim that its associational freedom under the First
Amendment was violated was premature....
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Blackmun interposed a short con-
curring opinion suggesting that they might not have joined in the result if the
Treasury Department's regulations had applied to all banking transactions.
223. See Chastain v. Saxbe, 510 F.2d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Tarlton v. Saxbe,
507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Even in these cases, the courts' analysis has dealt primarily with the agencies' statutory
authority to keep and disseminate the records, with constitutional discussions largely
consigned to dictum.
224. E.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
225. See generally Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Freed-
man, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 1 (1972);
Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1380 (1973>.
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compromised by privacy protections-indicates how slow and uncer-
tain the process of constitutional litigation can be.226
As these shortcomings in traditional privacy law have become ap-
parent, the focus of reform efforts has. shifted toward development of
legislation which could quickly and comprehensively prescribe standards
to protect individuals' informational privacy.227 A few statutes have been
enacted at the state228 or local229 level, and interest groups have been
organized to develop and promote uniform state laws in specialized areas
like medical records.2 0 However, by far the greatest concentration of
legislative activity on behalf of personal privacy has taken place at the
federal level. 231 In the closing days of the Ninety-Third Congress, this
activity culminated in passage of the Privacy Act of 1974,232 a statute
that seems sure to become the new model for legal protection of in-
formational privacy.
III. THE NEW LEGAL CONTROLS: THE PRIVACY
AcT OF 1974
As might be expected in Congress' first attempt to deal with in-
formational privacy problems generically,233 the Privacy Act reflects a
226. See notes 155, 159 supra & accompanying text. As the cases there cited indi-
cate, the question of what first amendment standards should be applied to privacy ac-
tions brought by individuals who are not "public figures" has remained in doubt for
nearly ten years.
227. See generally Kane, Book Review, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 331, 340-43 (1975);
Miller, supra note 174, at 1114-19; WESTIN & BAKER at 15-17.
228. See, e.g., Minnesota Stat. 1974, H.F. 1316, Computer Law Service App. 5-2b.
229. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal. Ordinance 4732-NS, Oct. 29, 1974 (copy available
in the files of the Buffalo Law Review) requiring a "social impact statement" before funds
are expended to change any automated city personal data system.
230. See, e.g., Barton, Should a National Commission for the Preservation of Con-
fidentiality of Health Records Be Formed?, 12 PSYCHIATRic OPINION 15 (January, 1975);
Council of State Governments News Release, Dec. 26, 1975 (state and local government
officials cooperating in development of state privacy legislation).
231. The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service reports that "up-
wards of 200 bills pertaining to privacy" were introduced in the Ninety-Third Congress.
L. Becker, Privacy; Information Technology Implications 3, March 21, 1975 (mimeo-
graph, Issue Brief No. IB 74105).
232. 88 Stat. 1897 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Act]. Privacy Act § 3,
amends 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. I, 1975) by adding to it § 552a (Supp I, 1975) [here-
inafter cited as 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a]. The haste with which the legislation was enacted is
reflected in the fact that the bills passed by the House and Senate did not even go to a
conference committee; instead, committee staff members in the two houses worked out
a compromise, and it was adopted through floor action. See generally 120 CONG. REc.
12,243 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Morehead). In place of a conference
committee report, there is a staff "Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amend-
ments to the Federal Privacy Act." Id. at 12,243-246 [hereinafter cited as Staff Anal-
ysis].
233. The major legislative precursor to the Privacy Act, the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81(t) (1970), differs in this respect by virtue of its limitation
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relatively cautious approach to the kinds of information systems that
are covered, and the control mechanisms that are employed. In con-
trast to some of the privacy bills considered by Congress, the Act does
not deal directly with data systems operated by private organizations
or state and local governments. Instead, it applies only to information
systems 234 which are either operated by federal agencies, or used by
government contractors performing an "agency function,"235 a rather
fuzzy jurisdictional boundary which has been interpreted to include
nonfederal intermediaries and carriers in programs like Medicare. 2 0
Moreover, the Act rejected proposals for "strong" regulatory controls
such as a requirement that computer systems handling personal records
to data that affects credit-granting decisions. Similarly, the "Buckley Amendments," Pub.
L. No. 93-380, § 315 (1974), dealt only with the privacy of student records; even so,
problems in implementing these provisions resulted in early amendment. See Pub. L. No.
93-568, § 2 (1974).
234. The Act applies to both manual and machine record systems. A "record" for
purposes of the Act is defined to include "any item, collection, or grouping of informa-
tion about an indivilual . . .including, but not limited to, his education, financial trans-
actions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains" some
identifying particular like the individual's name. 5 U.S.G.A. § 552a(a) (4) (emphasis
added). Thus, identifiable records are distinguished from statistical records. See id. at
§ 552a(a)6. But the level at which many of the Act's provisions operate is the "sys-
tem of records," defined as "a group of any records under the control of any agency
from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some . . .
identifying particular ... ." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(a) (5). The Office of Management and
Budget Guidelines for implementation of the Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 28949, 28952 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as OMB Guidelines] emphasize two limitations implicit in this defi-
nition: (1) it is not sufficient that the agency merely have the capability of accessing
records by the individual's name or identifier, but rather it must actually access the
records in this manner; and (2) the record system must be official records of the agency
rather than personal records of agency employees such as personal telephone lists or
"[u]ncirculated personal notes, papers and records which are retained or discarded at
the author's discretion." Id. The OMB Guidelines take the position that agencies have
broad discretion in determining what groupings of records constitute separate "systems"
for purposes of the Act. See id. at 28962-63. Whether these interpretations develop into
serious "loopholes" in the Act's coverage remains to be seen; however, it does seem
that they are broadly consistent with the Privacy Act's general philosophy of trying to
remedy large scale, serious threats to privacy rather than dealing exhaustively with every
possible abuse of personal information.
235. 5 U.S.G.A. § 552a(m) provides in part: "When an agency provides by a con-
tract for the operation by or on behalf of the agency of a system of records to accom-
plish an agency function, the agency shall, consistent with its authority, cause the re-
quirements of this section to be applied to such system."
236. HEW concluded that "intermediaries and carriers are agents of the Depart-
ment (as well as contractors) in carrying out Medicare functions." 40 Fed. Reg. 47406
(1975). The OMB Guidelines generally interpret the "contractor provision" to restrict
its coverage. See, e.g., OMB Guidelines which read:
The qualifying phrase "to accomplish an agency function" limits the applica-
bility of subsection (m) to these systems directly related to the performance of
Federal agency functions by excluding from its coverage systems which are
financed, in whole-or in part, with Federal funds but which are managed by
state or local governments for the benefit of state or local governments.
40 Fed. Reg. at 28951. See also id. at 28975-76.
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be licensed by an administrative agency237 or even creation of the "non:
regulatory commission" with investigative powers that was included
in the Senate-passed version of the Privacy Act.238 Instead, the Congress
chose to rely on public disclosure and rulemaking by existing agencies,
supplemented with private judicial and administrative remedies to
cure specific abuses. A temporary Study Commission was also provided
to evaluate the functioning of the Act, and report back to Congress.
239
Thus, in significant ways the Privacy Act is a modest, tentative step
toward evolution of a comprehensive system of legal safeguards for
personal information; even so, however, it is unquestionably a sweep-
ing innovation in prior law and practice.
Many provisions of the Privacy Act reflect approaches that were,
developed in the Fair Credit Reporting Act,240 and then expanded and
refined by the HEW Advisory Committee Report, Records Computers,
and the Rights of Citizens. 241 In accord with the HEW Report, the Act
seeks to attain four basic types of objectives in regulating personal in-
formation systems: public accountability of system operators, limits on
who can obtain access to identifiable records, accuracy of the data, and
237. See generally HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 170-71; H.R. 9786, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 10610, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Variations on the licensing
theme include proposals for occupational licensing of personnel who are engaged in
handling personal data (Cf. H.R. 2620, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)), which proposed
licensing of consumer credit investigators by a federal agency. Also proposed were bills
that would create an agency empowered to issue rules defining "fair information prac-
tices" and then adjudicate complaints of violations. See, e.g., H.R. 12207, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); H.R. 12880, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 13304, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974).
238. See generally 120 CONG. Rte. 19,835 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (remarks of
Senator Ervin); id. at 19,858-62. The investigative commission approach seems func-
tionally similar to an ombudsman model, which was rejected by the HEW REPORT at 42:
[The] ombudsman concept is basically remedial and will, therefore, work best
in the context of established rights and procedures. Furthermore, the function is
not well understood or widely accepted in America, and some observers feel
that it has severe limitations in the context of American legal, political and
administrative traditions.
239. The Privacy Protection Study Commission established by section 5 of the
Privacy Act is a tripartite advisory committee consisting of seven members, three ap-
pointed by the President and two each by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate. Id. § 5(a) (1). Among the topics that the Commission is authorized to
investigate are medical and insurance activities involving personal information. Id.
§ 5(c) (2) (A). The Commission is required to make its final report and recommenda-
tions to Congress and the President within two years of the date on which all Comnmis-
sioners have been appointed. Id. §. 5(g). This is true even though this amount of time
may be an unreasonably short time in which to assess operational experience under the
Act.




fairness to individuals who may be adversely affected when decisions
are based on identifiable records. 242
The Act's basic tool to assure public accountability and prevent
the growth of secret data systems is Federal Register publication of no-
tices describing the general characteristics of covered data systems.2 43
These general notices must be published annually,244 and if the agency
proposes a "new use" of data- presumably one not described in a prior
notice-it must publish the proposal and give interested persons an
opportunity to comment at least 30 days before the regular annual no-
tice.245 Similarly, establishment of a new personal information system,
or alteration of an existing system, must be preceded by "adequate ad-
vance notice" to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget.24
Paralleling these public notice provisions is a directive to the agencies
to promulgate detailed rules under the Administrative Procedure Act's
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure implementing the public
242. The articulation of these goals in the HEW REPORT at xx-xxi was somewhat
more elaborate:
There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence
is secret. There must be a way for an individual to find out what information
about him is in a record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that
was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other
purposes without his consent.
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identi-
fiable information about him.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of identi-
fiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended
use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
243. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (4). Among the matters required to be contained in the
published notice are the categories of records in the system, the categories of indi-
viduals on whom records are maintained, the routine uses of the records, and the proce-
dures for obtaining access. Id. The Office of Federal Register is required to publish an
annual directory of agency data systems and rules relating to storage of personal data
"in a form available to the public at low cost." Id. § 552a(f); cf. HEW REPORT at
244. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (4).
245. Id. § 552a(e) (11). The OMB Guidelines summarize the effect of the Act's
provisions requiring public notice of system changes as follows:
Generally, any change in a system which has the effect of expanding the cate-
gories of records maintained, the categories of individuals on whom records are
maintained, or the potential recipients of the information, will require the pub-
lication of a revised public notice before the change is put into effect. In addi-
tion, any modification that alters the procedures by which individuals exercise
their rights under the Act (e.g. for gaining access) will require the publication
of a revised notice before that change becomes effective.
40 Fed. Reg. at 28963.
246. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(o). This section provides that the purpose of the advance
submission is "to permit an evaluation of the probable or potential effect of such pro-
posal on the privacy and other personal or property rights of individuals or the dis-
closure of information relating to such individuals, and its effect on the preservation of
the constitutional principles of federalism and separation of powers." Id.
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access rights conferred by the Act.247 Finally, notice to individual data
subjects is required at the time when the agency attempts to collect
personal information. The notice must specify the source of the agency's
authority to collect the information, the uses that will be made of it,
and the consequences to the data subject if he refuses to supply the re-
quested data.248
The extent to which this notice-and-opportunity-to-object approach
will be effective in curbing or eliminating improper agency practices
may be largely dependent on the participation of well organized in-
terest groups who are able to provide timely criticism and suggest reason-
able alternatives.249 In the field of medical records, the major candidates
to fill this role are consumer and provider groups-welfare rights or-
ganizations, public interest groups involved in health care issues, vet-
erans' organizations, medical societies concerned about government in-
trusions on the doctor-patient relationship, or professional associations
of medical record librarians and other administrative personnel. For all
of these kinds of organizations, it may be difficult to mobilize either
expertise about information systems and technology, or constituency
support and financial resources sufficient to maintain effective partici-
pation. It is, of course, possible that organizational priorities will shift,
or new activist groups will emerge to represent the interest of medical
privacy; however, it seems more likely that most of the effective public
input will come from data users rather than data subjects.
Public disclosure and accountability goals are also implicit in the
portions of the Privacy Act dealing with access to personal records
stored in covered systems. While the statutory provisions are complex
and subject to exceptions, 250 the underlying philosophy is straightfor-
247. Id. § 552a(f).
248. Id. § 552a(e) (3).
249. Cf. Crainton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation
in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525, 529 (1972), which states:
[Our] governmental institutions are highly responsive. But responsive to what?
... They are responsive to the inputs they receive, including the feedback that
greets their actions.
The cardinal fact that underlies the demand for broadened public partici-
pation is that governmental agencies rarely respond to interests that are not
represented in their proceedings. And they are exposed, with rare and some-
what insignificant exceptions, only to the view of those who have a sufficient
economic stake in a proceeding or succession of proceedings to warrant the
substantial expense of hiring lawyers and expert witnesses to make a case for
them.
250. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(j), (k) establish "general" and "specific" exemptions to
certain provisions of the Act. Since the kinds of records covered by these exemptions-
e.g., criminal justice information and Central Intelligence Agency files-will not typically
contain large quantities of medical information, they are not discussed in detail here.
See generally OMB Guidelines at 28971-74.
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ward: identifiable records can be used or disclosed either pursuant to
general rules publicly established, or with the specific consent of the
data subject. The Act itself provides some general standards defining
proper disclosures. Personal information can be released without ob-
taining the data subject's consent to personnel of the agency maintain-
ing the records who need to use the records in performing their official
duties, 251 to members of the public seeking records that must be dis-
closed under the Freedom of Information Act,212 to Congress or the
Comptroller General,25 3 to statistical users and the National Archives, 254
to a government instrumentality for civil or criminal law enforcement
purposes, 255 and to any person if the disclosure is pursuant to court
order 256 or is based upon a showing of "compelling circumstances af-
fecting the health or safety of an individual. 257 In addition to these
251. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (1). The OMB Guidelines at 28954 interpret the legis-
lative history as reflecting Congress' intention that there be constraints on the use of rec-
ords within the agency:
Minimally, the recipient officer or employee must have an official "need to
know." The language would also seem to imply that the use should be generally
related to the purpose for which the record is maintained.
Id.
252. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (2). Exemption (6) of the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1970), authorizes agencies to withhold from the public "per-
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The 1974 amendments to the Freedom of
Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, also added a privacy provision to exemption (7):
agencies may now refuse to disclose investigatory files only to the extent that disclosure
would, inter alia, "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The 0MB
Guidelines at 28954 interpret the Privacy Act exception as applying only to disclosures
that are mandatory under the Freedom of Information Act; discretionary disclosures,
without the data subject's consent, would be prohibited unless this type of disclosure
had been published as a "routine use." See text accompanying notes 258-61 infra.
253. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (9)-(10).
254. Id. §§ 552a(b)(4) (Bureau of the Census); § 552a(b)(6) (National Ar-
chives); § 552a(b) (5) ("to a recipient who has provided the agency with advance ade-
quate written assurance that the record will be used solely as a statistical research or
reporting record, and the record is to be transferred in a form that is not individually
identifiable").
255. Id. § 552a(b) (7). Disclosure under this section can be made only if the law
enforcement activity "is authorized by law, and if the head of the agency or instru-
mentality has made a written request to the agency which maintains the records specify-
ing the particular portion desired and the law enforcement activity for which the record
is sought." If the law enforcement agency had not requested the records in question,
the record-keeping agency still might disclose them as a routine use. OMB Guide-
lines at 28955.
256. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (11). Section 552a(e) (8) of the Act requires agencies
to "make reasonable efforts to serve notice on an individual when any record on such
individual is made available to any person under compulsory legal process when such
process becomes a matter of public record."
257. Id. § 552a(b) (8). The OMB Guidelines at 28955 note that "[t]he indi-
vidual pertaining to whom the record are disclosed [sicl need not necessarily be the indi-
vidual whose health or safety is at peril; e.g., release of dental records on several indi-
viduals in order to identify an individual who was injured in an accident."
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statutorily-approved disclosures, the agency maintaining the system can
provide further exceptions to the consent requirement after appro-
priate public notice258 under the "routine use" standard. A "routine
use" is one which is "compatible with the purpose for which [the rec-
ord] was collected."25 9 Apparently this would include uses beyond the
"explicit and expressed purposes for which [the data] was collected,"2 0
including some which lie outside the jurisdiction of the collecting
agency or have only tangential relevance to the disclosing agency's statu-
tory mandate. The example given during floor debate by Senator Ervin,
a principal sponsor of the bill, demonstrates that "compatibility" can
be quite broadly defined to legitimize a great variety of current data-
sharing relationships:
[The [Internal Revenue Service] sends to State, and local, tax agen-
cies the Federal tax returns of individuals who live in the State so the
State agency can check to see if the individual has reported the
same income and deductions on his Federal and State, or local, tax
returns.... [T]he States rely on this information in enforcing their
own tax laws. Also, this information may be sent to a State before
it conducts a tax investigation on its own.
Under the bill, it is intended that this would be a routine use for
a purpose compatible with the purpose for which the information is
collected so the IRS can continue to send tax information to State and
local tax agencies in this way.261
Under this rationale, it seems clear that most of the arrangements be-
tween the Social Security Administration and the states to share medical
records would meet the "compatibility" criterion, and could be con-
tinued unchanged under the Privacy Act if proper notice was given.
Obviously, these basic access limitations are not very onerous stand-
ards to meet. The vagueness of some of the operative terms like "civil or
criminal law enforcement activity,"2 62 the possibility that data subject
258. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(b) (3), (e) (4) (D).
259. Id. § 552a(a) (7). See also id. § 552a(b) (3).
260. OMB Guidelines at 28953.
The term "routine use" was introduced to recognize the practical limitations of
restricting use of information to explicit and expressed purposes for which it was
collected. It recognizes that there are appropriate and corollary purposes... that
are appropriate and necessary for the efficient conduct of government and in the
best interest of the individual and the public.
Id.
261. 120 CONG. REc. 21815 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
262. 5 U.S.O.A. § 552a(b) (7). Neither the legislative history nor the OMB Guide-
lines seems to provide much guidance as to what actions, taken by an agency within its
powers, would not be a "civil or criminal law enforcement activity."
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consent may be abused even if none of the exceptions is invoked,2 3 and
the broad discretion that agencies seem to have in defining "routine
uses," all suggest that the access controls may function simply as a
mechanism to compel agencies to devote some systematic thought to
their disclosure policies, rather than as a set of firm, definite limitations
on the sharing of personal records. 2 4 Similar vagueness of statutory lan-
guage and implementing regulations may dilute the effectiveness of
two other Privacy Act provisions designed to protect against unauthor-
ized or improper disclosure: the requirements that agencies "establish
appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to insure
the security and confidentiality of records" in order to protect data
subjects from harm or embarassment,2 5 and the directive that agencies
establish rules of conduct for information-handlers. 2 6 Undoubtedly the
need to take account of unique data system features or particular agency
programs, as well as the generally undeveloped state of knowledge in
the fields of technical security and administrative controls, 267 were the
263. See text accompanying notes 173-91 supra. The OMB Guidelines at 28954
show some awareness of the coerced consent problem:
[C]are must be exercised to assure that the language of the request [for consent]
is not coercive and that any consequences of refusing to consent are made
clear...
The consent provision of this subsection was not intended to permit a
blanket or openended consent clause: i.e., one which would permit an agency
to disclose a record without limit. At a minimum, the consent clause should
state the general purposes for, or types of recipients, to which disclosure may
be made.
264. This limited purpose of the Act is explicitly endorsed in the congressional
Staff Analysis adopted in lieu of a Conference Committee Report. See note 232 supra.
Part of the Analysis reads:
The compromise definition should serve as a caution to agencies to think
out in advance what uses it [sic] will make of information. This act is not in-
tended to impose undue burdens on the transfer of information to the Treasury
Department to complete payroll checks, the receipt of information by the
Social Security Administration to complete quarterly posting of accounts,
or other such housekeeping measures and necessarily frequent interagency or
intraagency transfers of information. It is, however, intended to discourage the
unnecessary exchange of information to other persons or agencies who may not
be as sensitive to the collecting agency's reasons for using and interpreting the
material.
Id. at 12244.
265. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (10). See also OMB Guidelines at 28966.
266. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (9). In addition to promulgating the rules, the agency
is required to "instruct each such person [involved in the design, development, opera-
tion, or maintenance of any system of records, or in maintaining any record] with respect
to such rules and the requirements of this section." Id. See also OMB Guidelines at
28965-66.
267. The OMB Guidelines at 28966 on the technical security requirements empha-
size these kinds of problems:
The development of appropriate administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards will, necessarily, have to be tdilored to the requirements of each
system of records and other related requirements for security and confidentiality.
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principal reasons why more detailed standards have not been written.
But it is also clear that the lack of articulated general principles in
these areas means that development of effective privacy protection cri-
teria and techniques will depend primarily upon the discretion and
good faith of the data collecting agencies, and to a lesser extent on the
willingness of the courts to give enforceable content to the vague statu-
tory standards in any civil action that may be brought.2 8
Another major device which the Privacy Act uses to control dis-
semination of personal records, the "accounting of certain disclosures"2 69
or "access log," should be more easily enforceable. 270 The purpose of
the accounting is to provide a record of all significant disclosures27 af-
fecting each data subject's file, and to make this record available to
the data subject so that he can discover who has been using his personal
data and for what purposes.272 Since the "routine use" and other dis-
closure provisions of the Act previously discussed make it relatively easy
for agencies to legitimize data sharing arrangements, the accounting
device probably will not uncover a great number of unauthorized dis-
The need to assure the integrity of and to prevent unauthorized access to, sys-
tems of records will be determined not only by the requirements of this Act
but also by other factors like the requirement for continuity of agency opera-
tions, the need to protect proprietary data, applicable access restrictions to
protect the national security, and the need for accuracy and reliability of agency
information.
While the technology of system security (both for computer-based and 'L
other systems of records) is well developed as it relates to materials classified for
reasons of national defense or foreign policy, few standards currently exist to
guide a "civil" agency in this area.
See also text accompanying notes 299-308 infra.
268. See text accompanying note 264 supra.
269. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(c).
270. Enforcement of the "accounting of disclosures" could, however, be com-
pletely frustrated if agency personnel were able to falsify or conceal portions of the ac-
counting. Cf. Ralph Nader's charge that agencies have deliberately given deceptive re-
sponses, or concealed documents, in acting upon requests for records under the Freedom
of Information Act. Nader, Freedom From Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5
HARv. Civ. R GHTS--rv. LIB. L. REv. 1, 10-13 (1970). The Privacy Act's criminal
penalties provisions, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(i), apparently would not prohibit willful alter -
tion of the accounting of disclosures.
271. The accounting requirement does not apply to disclosures required by the
Freedom of Information Act, or to uses of the record by personnel of the agency main-
taining the record system in the performance of their official duties. 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552a(c)(1).
272. Although an accounting must include disclosures made to law enforcement
agencies, this aspect of the accounting is not available to the data subject. 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552a(c) (3). The accounting must include "the date, nature, and purpose of each
disclosure of a record to any person or to another agency" and the name and address of
the data recipient. Id. § 552a(c) (1) (A)-(B). It must also be retained "for at least five
years or the life of the record, whichever is longer, after the disclosure for which the ac-
counting is made." Id. § 552a(c) (2).
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closures. Rather, its main utility in limiting access to personal records27
may be as a notice device to support public participation in rulemaking
by highlighting particular data disclosure practices that threaten groups
or individuals who are potential participants.
In addition to the foregoing access controls that are addressed to
potential transferor agencies, the Act also contains a limit on poten-
tial transferee agencies: they must "collect information to the greatest
extent practicable directly from the subject individual when the in-
formation may result in adverse determinations about an individual's
rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs."274 This re-
quirement effectively reverses the prior practice of encouraging the
agencies to share data bases when the exchange would reduce the bur-
den on respondents, 2 75 and its effects obviously hinge on the content
that will be given to the word "practicable." In an effort to structure
agency discretion in this area, the Office of Management and Budget
guidelines for implementation of the Privacy Act suggest several fac-
tors for an agency to consider in determining whether direct collec-
tion is practicable: 27 "the nature of the program" 277 ; the risk that er-
roneous information would adversely affect the data subject; the rela-
tive costs of direct and third-party data collection; the need to assure
the accuracy of information supplied by an individual by verifying it
with a third party; and, conversely, the posssibility of verifying third-
party information with the individual before using it to make particu-
larized determinations of his liabilities or entitlement to benefits. Al-
though they are an improvement over the open-ended statutory lan-
guage, these criteria still leave the agencies considerable latitude to
273. The accounting of disclosures should be more effective in assuring accuracy
and fairness under the provision of the Privacy Act which requires agencies that have
corrected a disputed record to send copies of the correction to prior recipients of the
record. See text accompanying notes 295-97 infra.
274. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (e) (2).
275. OMB Guidelines at 28961. See also A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY
141-45 (1971).
276. OMB Guidelines at 28961.
277. The example given in the OMB Guidelines is not very helpful in interpreting
this criterion: "[I]t may well be that the kind of information needed can only be ob-
tained from a third party such as investigations of possible criminal misconduct; . . ."
Id. The impracticability of going to a criminal suspect is obvious, but it is not apparent
whether there are other circumstances in which the "nature of the progarm" would
argue in favor of gathering data from a third party. Perhaps what is meant is that agen-
cies should consider whether the nature of the function they are performing would induce
people to report erroneous information about themselves-either because they fear
sanctions, or because they may become eligible for a benefit. If the principle is this
broad, it would seem to argue in favor of third-party collection in most of the major




justify data-sharing. The relative cost consideration, without a strong
presumption in favor of privacy that seems lacking in the guidelines,
will frequently weigh heavily in favor of getting the records from a
third party; and the Guideline's emphasis on accuracy considerations-
the need to verify information by obtaining it from multiple sources-
provides a convenient rationale for maintaning existing data-sharing
relationships. In the medical records field, it will always be possible to
argue that diagnostic or prognostic information is too poorly under-
stood by patients to make direct collection from the data subject "prac-
ticable."
The Privacy Act's fairness and accuracy safeguards are contained
in three sets of provisions which are designed to give the individual data
subject some right to control the ways in which his personal records are
used. The standards contained in the first set of provisions are designed
to assure that the data subject will not be adversely affected by wrong
or irrelevant or incomplete data.278 Thus, the agency using identifiable
records is directed to "maintain in its records only such information
about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a pur-
pose ... required to be accomplished by statute or executive order, '279
and at the same time is instructed to "maintain all records which are
used by the agency in making any determination about any individual
with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness and completeness as is reason-
ably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determina-
tion."28 0 At first impression these two provisions, read together, may
seem to impose an impossibly high standard on the agencies: as the
0MB Guidelines point out, the personal information must be not only
relevant but necessary as well, 28' which means that personal data used
in informal agency action may be subject to more stringent tests of
"admissibility" than similar evidence introduced in trial-type hear-
ings.2 2 Nevertheless, concepts like "timeliness," "completeness" and
278. In addition to the provisions discussed in the text, 5 U.S.O.A. § 552a(e) (6)
directs the data-collecting agency "prior to disseminating any record about an indi-
vidual to any person other than an agency. . .[unless the dissemination is required by
the Freedom of Information Act, to] make reasonable efforts to assure that such records
are accurate, complete, timely, and relevant for agency purposes; . . ." See also id.
at § 552a(e)(7) (agencies prohibited from maintaining records about exercise of first
amendment rights "unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about
whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an author-
ized law enforcement activity").
279. 5 U.S.O.A. § 552a(e) (1).
280. Id. § 552a(e) (5).
281. OMB Guidelines at 28960.
282. Id. at 28961:
It should be noted that subsection (e) [of the Privacy Act] is not intended
to interfere with the presentation of evidence by the parties before a quasi-
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"necessity" can be interpreted as conferring a reasonable amount of
agency discretion,28 and, more importantly, they seem susceptible to
more detailed elaboration of standards.2 4 If the courts adjudicating
civil remedy actions 28 5 become involved in the process of developing
more detailed standards, and compel the agencies to justify their data-
gathering in detail, the "accuracy, relevance, timeliness and complete-
ness" requirement may become one of the stronger protections of
the Privacy Act.
The second major set of fairness and accuracy provisions in the
Act gives the data subject a right, modeled on the Fair Credit Reporting
Act,2 6 to find out whether an agency has information about him, 287 to
gain access to his record,28 and to obtain a copy.2 9 This access right
extends to medical or psychiatric records as well, in contrast to the pre-
vailing law and the custom among members of the medical profession. 20
judicial or quasi-legislative body. For example, a quasi-judicial board or com-
mission need not reject otherwise admissible evidence because it is offered by a
part[y] other than the individual to whom it relates or because it is not
"necessary" to the decision or is not "complete." The normal rules of evidence
would [continue] to govern in such situations.
283. See id. at 28960, 28964-65.
284. For example, the OMB Guidelines suggest a number of factors that bear on
the determination of whether the data is "necessary," including the following:
Could the need be met through the use of information that is not in indi-
vidually identifiable form?
Does the information need to be collected on every individual who is the
subject of a record in the system or would a sampling procedure suffice?
At what point will the information have satisfied the purpose for which
it was collected, i.e., how long is it necessary to retain the information? . ..
Is the information, while generally relevant and necessary to accomplish
a statutory purpose, specifically relevant and necessary only in certain cases?
For example in establishing financial need as part of assessing eligibility for
a program for which need is a legitimate criterion, parental income may be
relevant only for certain applicants.
Id. at 28960.
285. See text accompanying notes 299-308 infra. Subsection 552a (g) (1) (C) of the
Privacy Act specifically provides for a court action if an agency "fails to maintain any
record concerning any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and com-
pleteness as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relating to the qualifi-
cations, character, rights, or opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that may be
made on the basis of such record, and consequently a determination is made which is
adverse to the individual."
286. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970).
287. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(f) (1).
288. Id. § 552a(d) (1). The data subject may have "a person of his own choosing
to accompany him," but in this situation the agency may require a written statement
authorizing the agency to discuss the data in the accompanying person's presence. Id.
289. Id. Agencies may charge for copies of records furnished to data subjects, but
they may not charge them for the agency's cost of searching and reviewing the records.
Id. § 552a(f) (5).
290. See generally Kaiser, Patients' Rights of Access to Their Own Medical Records:
The Need for New Law, 24 BuFFAo L. REv. 317 (1975).
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However, when medical records are sought the agencies may by rule
establish "special procedures" 291 such as disclosing to a physician chosen
by the data subject rather than directly to the data subject himself.292
Apart from these special procedures, however, the Act does not attempt
to deal with the risk that organizations with economic leverage or other
forms of power over the individual data subject will use this advantage
to compel the individual to obtain copies of his records and submit
them with applications for benefits. 293 Since medical records often are
relevant to employment or credit granting decisions, and since govern-
ment agencies ranging from the military to the Medicare program col-
lect large quantities of medical information, this risk may not be in-
substantial.
The final type of procedure created by the Privacy Act to promote
accuracy and fairness in government information use is the right to
contest inaccurate or incomplete data, and to compel a correction. The
mechanism is similar to that of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.294 When
a data subject disputes the accuracy of material in his file, he can ob-
tain review of the question within the agency. If the agency ultimately
refuses to make the requested correction, the data subject may file a
"concise statement of disagreement" to be incorporated in his file.295
The dispute must be noted in the file in any subsequent disclosures, 296
and a correction or notation of the dispute must also be sent to all per-
sons who previously received the data if there is an "accounting of dis-
closures. '297 Finally, a data subject who is dissatisfied with agency per-
formance in correcting records or implementing other safeguards estab-
lished by the Act may bring a suit in federal court seeking civil reme-
dies.29 8
291. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(f) (3).
292. OMB Guidelines at 28957. The Guidelines also indicate that agencies should
use "far more stringent measures" to validate the identity of the person seeking access
"when the records sought to be accessed are medical or other sensitive records." Id.
293. Indeed, the OMB Guidelines state that under the Act, the agencies may not
even ask why the data subject wants his record: "The granting of access may not be
conditioned upon any requirement to state a reason or otherwise justify the need to gain
access." Id. at 28957.
294. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1970).
295. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(2)-(3).
296. Id. § 552a(d)(4).
297. Id. § 552a(c) (4).
298. The Act also provides criminal penalties for limited categories of violations.
Under 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(i), wrongful disclosure of agency records containing indi-
vidually identifiable information, willful maintenance of a record system without meeting
statutory notice requirements, and requesting or obtaining identifiable records under
false pretenses are misdemeanors punishable by a fine of $5,000.
It seems unlikely that criminal penalties will play a significant role in administra-
tion of the Act. In addition to the low priority such crimes would receive from prose-
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The Privacy Act creates four different kinds of actions for civil
remedies. If an agency refuses a data subject's request for access to his
records, he can bring an action to compel production, and the burden
is on the agency to sustain its refusal.299 Similarly, if the agency refuses
to amend a record in response to a contention that it is inaccurate, the
data subject can obtain a trial de novo and the court may order the
agency to amend the record. 00 For other types of violations, the data
subject can obtain damages rather than injunctive relief. When the in-
dividual suffers an injury because of the agency's failure to maintain
records "with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as
is necessary to assure fairness," 01 or he is adversely affected by an
agency's failure to comply with any other provision of the Act or its
implementing rules3 02 he can recover "actual damages" together with
costs and attorney's fees303 if he can show that the agency action was "in-
tentional or willful."304
cutors and the difficulty of showing criminal intent in many bureaucratic data-gathering
activities, the Senate Report on the Privacy Act pointed out another problem:
As introduced, the original bill contained strong criminal penalties for em-
ployees and others who violated or contributed to the violation of the Act.
These penalties were deleted in Committee for two main reasons: the difficulties
of effective enforcement through such criminal prosecutions and the possibility
that the threat of prosecution may preclude that "Whistleblowing" and dis-
closure of wrongdoing to Congress and the press which helps to promote "open
government."
S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1974).
299. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(g) (1) (B), 552a(g) (3) (A).
300. Id. §§ 552a(g) (1) (A), 552a(g) (2) (A).
301. Id. § 552a(g) (1) (C).
302. Id. § 552a(g) (1) (D).
303. Id. § 552a(g) (4). This section further stipulates that "in no case shall a per-
son entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000." Id. The Privacy Act also
uses the term "general damages." See § 5(c) (2) (B) (iii). But there does not appear
to be any explanation in the legislative history of a possible distinction between these
two terms.
304. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (4). According to the Staff Analysis on the compro-
mise bill, this formulation was intended to reflect a standard of conduct falling between
"gross negligence" and "willful, arbitrary and capricious." Staff Analysis, supra note
232, at 12245. This appears to be a rather confusing combination of tort doctrines and
administrative law standards for judicial review of agency action. In tort law, questions
of intent have generally dealt with the actor's certainty that the prohibited result would
occur:
[W]here a reasonable man in the defendant's position would believe that a
particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be dealt with ...
as though he had intended it....
On the other hand, the mere knowledge and appreciation of the risk,
short of substantial certainty, is not the equivalent of intent. The defendant
who acts in the belief or consciousness that he is causing an appreciable risk
of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is great his conduct may be
characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not classed as an intentional wrong.
W. PROSSER, LAw oF TORTS § 8, at 32 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted).
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Since personal information provides the basis for many agency
decisions, particularly those relating to individual entitlement to dis-
ability compensation or other benefits, judicial examination of agency
information practices under the Privacy Act's civil remedies will some-
times be functionally similar to judicial review of the merits of agency
action.305 Thus, litigants may attempt to raise Privacy Act violations
as a ground for invalidating agency action in existing statutory or non-
statutory review proceedings,30 6 or instead may try to use the Privacy
Act to seek review of administrative action when other routes to the
courts are unavailable or unsatisfactory. While Privacy Act review
would present some additional obstacles to the litigant, 0 7 it could also
305. This seems to be particularly true with regard to questions of the "accuracy,
relevance, timeliness and completeness" of the agency's information. See text accom-
panying notes 278-84 supra. On a related point, the OMB Guidelines at 28958 assert,
without citing any support in the legislative history, that:
These provisions for amending records are not intended to permit the alter-
ation of evidence presented in the course of judicial, quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative proceedings. Any changes in such records should be made only
through the established procedures consistent with the adversary process. These
provisions are not designed to permit collateral attack upon that which has
already been the subject of a judicial or quasi-judicial action.
Perhaps so, but one wonders whether the result could be predicted so confidently if
(a) the agency determination was an informal action taken without any trial-type or
rulemaking proceedings; or (b) the trial-type proceedings were available only at the
initiative of the data subject, and he elected to use the Privacy Act; or (c) quasi-
judicial proceedings were available at the agency's initiative, but the Privacy Act suit
was filed well before the agency decided whether to issue a complaint or otherwise go
forward with the action.
306. The OMB Guidelines suggest that the Privacy Act does not preclude judicial
review of violations of its provisions in other forms of action, including judicial review
of administrative action under the Administrative Procedure Act, id. at 28968. Elsewhere
however, the Guidelines argue that at least some violations of the Privacy Act would
not be sufficient ground for setting aside agency action. In discussing the Act's require-
ment that individuals be informed at the point of data collection why the personal in-
formation is being sought and what the consequences of refusal to provide it may be, the
Guidelines say:
It was not the intent of this subsection [of the Act] to create a right the
nonobservance of which would preclude the use of the information or void an
action taken on the basis of that information. For example, a failure to comply
with this section, in collecting crop yield data from a farmer, was not intended
to vitiate a crop import quota based, in part, upon such information. However,
such an individual may have grounds for civil action under [the Privacy Act]
... if he can show harm as a result of that determination.
OMB Guidelines at 28961-62.
However, at least in the situation where the only interests at stake are the data subject's
entitlement to a particular benefit (e.g.., a government disability compensation pay-
ment), the Privacy Act's actual damages may be functionally equivalent to a reversal
of an administrative denial on conventional review.
307. The most obvious difficulty in using the Privacy Act is proving the necessary
intent for violations which can bring civil penalties. See note 304 supra & accompanying
text. Also, when the party seeking review is other than the data subject of the records
in question, it may be difficult to establish standing under the Privacy Act.
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have some clear advantages over more conventional judicial review of
administrative action: trial de novo rather than the more limited re-
view of facts that would be available under the traditional substantial
evidence test,30 8 a possible means of avoiding doctrines like ripeness,
finality and exhaustion of administrative remedies that can frustrate or
delay other forms of review, and a subsidy for successful litigants
through the Act's award of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees for par-
ties who "substantially prevail," in addition to money damages for many
violations. Since neither the legislative history of the Privacy Act nor
the OMB guidelines discuss these issues in any great detail, it will un-
doubtedly require some years of litigation before the relationships be-
tveen the Act's remedies and other forms of review are fully estab-
lished.
IV. BEYOND THE PRIVACY AcT
Although the Privacy Act of 1974 is the most recent innovation in
the ongoing evolution of legal responses to the privacy issue, it is al-
ready clear that the Act raises or leaves unresolved many questions about
the shape of future efforts to safeguard medical records or other personal
information. In general, these questions seem to fall into two broad
categories: problems concerning the technical effectiveness of the Act's
provisions, and more basic questions about the nature of the values that
the Act is trying to serve.
One technical question that is explicitly reserved for later decision
by the Privacy Act3 9 is whether it makes sense to end the Act's cover-
age with federal agencies and their contractors, rather than extending it
to all information systems.8 10 In the medical records field, and particu-
308. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1970).
309. The Privacy Protection Study Commission, supra note 239, is explicitly directed
to make a recommendation to the President and the Congress regarding "the extent, if
any, to which the requirements and principles of [the Act] . . . should be applied to
the information practices of [governmental, regional and private] organizations by legis-
lation, administrative action, or voluntary adoption ... " Privacy Act § 5(b) (2).
See also H.R. 1984, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
310. Cf. S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 298, at 17-19, which describes the process
by which the Senate-passed version of the Act was limited to federal data systems:
As introduced, S.3418 applied to all governmental and private organiza-
tions which maintained a personal information system, under supervision of a
strong regulatory body, with provision for delegating power to State instrumen-
talities....
D)espite calls by . . . witnesses for total or partial coverage, the Committee
was persuaded to delay a decision on total application by considerations of time
and investigative resources for developing a full hearing record and for drafting




larly in the area of third-party payments, the institutional relationships
that have developed make the line drawn by the Act seem artificial and
unworkable. Within the major categories of medical record use-clin-
ical care, statistical research and planning, and payment for services-
the trend seems to be toward collaborative, large-scale information sys-
tems, with little regard to whether the organizations participating are
state or federal, public or private. More basically, the economies of scale
that argue in favor of large, often multistate systems, 311 together with
the ease of transmitting data over national communications networks, 31 2
will undoubtedly lead to development of more regional and national
systems that are effectively beyond the control of any one state; and, in
any event, the states have shown little ability or interest in providing
comprehensive protection for personal information.
If the coverage of the Privacy Act seems too narrowly confined in
its limitation to federal systems, it may be that at the same time it
sweeps too broadly by providing uniform safeguards for systems han-
dling different kinds of information. Some commentators have urged
that control provisions should be tailored to the nature of the data
systems, with separate legislation for criminal justice systems, credit
reporting organizations, medical record systems, and so on.313 However,
311. See text accompanying notes 125-29 supra. See also Report to the Committee
on Scientific and Technical Information of the Federal Council on Science and Tech-
nology from the Panel on Legal Aspects of Information Systems, 7 HONEYWELL COM-
PUTER J. No. 1, at I-1, 11-9 (1973), which reads:
[S]torage costs [for computerized information] may be expected to decrease
rapidly with time and, in fact, will approach or be lower than that available with
other media today, specifically including paper and microfilm....
• . . The extremely low costs are inevitably associated with very large
volumes of information. Such extremely low costs do not appear to be achieve-
able in computerized systems if the quantities of information to be stored are
small. Thus the economy is truly one of scale-the costs of storage are still sub-
stantial, but the volume of storage is so enormous that the cost per unit of in-
formation is very low.
312. Cf. Report, supra note 311, which states:
Future communications costs... must be regarded with care, since today's
experience will not carry over directly. The fundamental communications system
we are using today (the telephone system) was designed for voice service. Its
use for carrying data is an afterthought and, as a result, the system is limited
in capacity. . . . The common carrier companies are beginning to put in place
communication systems especially designed for data communications, whose costs
for data transfer will be dramatically lower.
Id. See also id. at II-10 to II-11.
313. See, e.g., WESTIN & BAKER at 350-51:
[I]t appears clear to us that no single law, constitutional amendment, or
court decision can cope with the tremendous diversity of issues and settings,
and the uneven readiness for corrective action, that make up the current data-
bank problem. Such total solutions are not worth pursuing.
Of similar effect is the distinction sometimes made between "primary" or clinical medical
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the institutional relationships and data flows evidence a practical disre-
spect for these kinds of conceptual boundaries that makes it frequently
difficult, and sometimes pointless, to categorize a particular system or
item of information. If an investigative reporting agency preparing an
insurance claim report obtains hospital records showing that a particular
data subject was treated for a mild heart attack, and then incorporates
this information in its own files so that it may later be used in response
to queries from other insurers, or credit grantors, or potential employ-
ers, does the information change from a "medical record" to an "in-
surance record" to "credit" or "employment" data, and thereby require
differential safeguards? The problem is that the sensitivity of a given
item of information is partly contextual or use-related and partly in-
herent,314 so that classification schemes based wholly on either dimen-
sion are in some measure unsatisfactory. Given the general lack of ex-
perience in implementing privacy controls, and the multiple uses made
of medical records and other personal information, perhaps the most
reasonable approach for the present is the Privacy Act's adoption of
across-the-board controls, accompanied by rather generous escape
hatches to permit adjustments where unique circumstances warrant.
Another major technical question about the Privacy Act is whether
its remedial provisions will be effective in achieving their intended
purposes. Both of the major enforcement devices provided by the Act,
public notice and private litigation, have inherent weaknesses that may
undermine the statute's safeguards. The public notice and opportunity
to comment controls which govern the important issues of system struc-
ture, content and access policy reflect the philosophy that "sunlight is
the best disinfectant," but in this context the maxim may be better
rhetoric than policy. Ultimately, the effectiveness of notice-and-com-
ment approaches depends primarily upon the ability of affected interests
to articulate their concerns forcefully and persuasively before entities
that can bring power to bear on the proposal in question-the propos-
ing agency itself, the Congress, the courts, or the media.3 15 The ability
of pro-privacy interests to mobilize and deploy the necessary resources
records and "secondary" or statistical-administrative records. See, e.g., Jackson, Con-
sideration of the "Active Working Record" Versus the "Permanent Record," 12 PSy-
CHIATRIC OPINION 29 (Jan., 1975).
314. Cf. Miller, supra note 174, at 1170-73.
315. Cf. S. LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS, 28 (1974):
These three items-wealth, organization, and persuasion-comprise the ele-
ments of influence in democratic politics. If everyone can participate by right
in the political process, then, inevitably, those who are best able to amass and
deploy the ingredients of influence will participate most effectively.
See also note 249 supra & accompanying text.
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seems questionable, at least in comparison to the planners, administra-
tors and other data users who will generally advocate intensive data col-
lection and free access to records.
For the Privacy Act's judicial controls to be effective, a sufficient
number of parties must be willing to use them, and the issues in liti-
gation must be framed so that the courts can exercise meaningful over-
sight of agency practices. Here, also, there are questions as to whether
the necessary conditions can be met. The Senate-passed version of the
Privacy Act concluded that private judicial enforcement would be in-
adequate to assure compliance, and that a separate, independent admin-
istrative agency should be created to enforce the Act's requirements.8 1
Some of the factors that may deter potential litigants include the low
visibility of many information misuses, with the result that the indi-
vidual may not be able to link a denial of benefit or other harm to a
violation of the statute; 317 the fact that the information practice objected
to may have already been immunized under the "routine use" provision
or some other exception; and the difficulty of proving the requisite in-
tent318 or sufficient actual damages to make the burdens of suing worth-
while.319 If factors like these prove to be serious obstacles to judicial
enforcement of the Privacy Act, or conversely if the Act's civil remedies
work so well that data users feel the need for regulation in order to
316. S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 298, at 16:
Contrary to the views of Administration spokesmen it is not enough to tell
agencies to gather and keep only data which is reliable . . . for whatever they
determine is their intended use, and then to pit the individual against govern-
ment, armed only with a power to inspect his file, and a right to challenge it
in court if he has the resources and the will to do so. To leave the situation
there is to shirk the duty of Congress to protect freedom from . . . incursions
by the arbitrary exercise of the power of government and to provide for the
fair and responsible use of that power. . . . For this reason, the establishment
of the Privacy Commission is essential as an aid to enforcement and oversight.
317. Apart from the notice of intended uses at the point of data collection (see
text accompanying note 248 supra), the data subject must take the initiative by (a) in-
quiring whether the agency has any records relating to him, (b) requesting access to
his record, and (c) requesting the "accounting of disclosures" indicating who has had
access to his record. Alternatives to this system, such as automatically providing all data
subjects with periodic reports on the contents of their records and the disclosures that
have been made, generally have been rejected as too costly. See HEW REPoRT at 62.
There is a middle ground that seems not to have been considered. For example, a random
sample of data subjects could be given periodic automatic reports, which if carefully
done should be adequate to expose patterns of error or abuse.
318. See note 304 supra.
319. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (4) (A) sets a bottom limit of $1,000 on the amount
of actual damages recoverable in a civil remedy action. While this will ease the problem
of measuring damages in doubtful cases, it still may be a rather inadequate inducement
to bear the burdens of litigation.
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assure their access to data bases,3 20 the proposals to establish a perma-
nent Privacy Agency may be revived.
The second aspect of judicial remedies under the Act, the form in
which questions will be presented to the courts, seems highly variable
among different provisions of the Act. The access-to-records procedures
are spelled out in detail, and implementation of these rights should be
rather straightforward. Other sections of the Privacy Act, such as the
"timeliness-relevance-accuracy-completeness" standard,321 seem suffi-
ciently analogous to functions that the courts already perform in passing
on questions of evidence or legality of administrative action that the
standards should be manageable, although doubtless some judges will
be reluctant to second-guess administrative practices in detail.3 22 Some
of the provisions, however, embody little more than congressional hope
that complex, difficult problems can be solved, and it seems unlikely
320. The idea is probably not as farfetched as it may sound. See, e.g., Report,
supra note 311, at 11-5, which reads:
It may be the case, with respect to certain fields of knowledge, that the
necessity of safeguards becomes more urgent as the consequences of a denial
of access assume greater magnitude; it may be desirable, e.g., that unique
knowledge banks serving such disciplines as medicine or political science are
more likely candidates for the imposition of government regulation designed to
achieve reasonable conditions of access than are comparable utilities dealing
with literature or with other disciplines where a knowledge bank's uniqueness is
not so pronounced. On the other hand, in some instances a concept of universal
access, albeit not necessarily gratis, may be appropriate.
321. See text accompanying notes 279-85 supra.
322. Cf. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where the
majority concluded that constitutional and statutory principles supported judicial review
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's handling of arrest records to determine whether
they had exercised "such reasonable care as the FBI is able to afford to avoid injury
to innocent citizens through dissemination of inaccurate information." Judge Wilkey,
dissenting, argued that this kind of inquiry was beyond the competence of the courts:
The breadth of the inquiry which the District Judge is directed to make
- . . clearly shows the legislative nature of the task entrusted to him.... The
inquiry involved is the type which a Congressional committee is supposed to
make, taking into account data on a nationwide basis from all interested parties,
before drafting and enacting legislation. This court thrusts on one District Judge
sitting in the District of Columbia a task of national scope.
507 F.2d at 1132. The courts may also find that computer operators' notions of accuracy
are quite different from lawyers'. Cf. Report, supra note 311, at 11-5 to 11-6, which
reads:
As a practical matter, and perhaps also as a matter of legal compulsion,
the user should be furnished by a knowledge bank with the following: (1) a
description of the parameters of the data base indicating the intended scope
and nature of the information utility he is dealing with; (2) a disclosure of the
subjective criteria utilized by the knowledge bank's personnel to determine what
is or is not suitable material for inclusion in the defined data base; (3) an
outline of the methodology of processing input to output; (4) a disclosure
of the methodology used in classifying and indexing information; and (5)
identification of computer output by source as either abridgement, fragmen-
tation, or interpolation from stored data.
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that the courts will be able to devise satisfactory solutions if these vague
provisions are made the subject of civil remedy actions.
Perhaps the most troublesome of these vague standards is the re-
quirement that agencies "establish appropriate administrative, tech-
nical, and physical safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality
of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to
their security or integrity which could result in harm, embarrassment,
inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on whom information
is maintained. 23 The difficulty is that the technology of data security
is not well developed, 324 and "the economics of information manage-
ment and the concomitant costs of confidentiality and security of in-
formation in automated data systems are neither well-understood, well-
documented, nor well-quantified." 32 5 The analyses of the subject that
are available suggest that the concept of "technical security" is multi-
faceted, and that a really "secure" system is likely to be neither cheap
nor easy to develop.3 26 In a computer system, at least three distinguish-
able kinds of goals are encompassed in the notion of technical security:
1) Protection against physical mishaps involving data in the system,
such as theft, fire, flood, and accidental or intentional destruction;
323. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e) (10).
324. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS,
GOVERNMENT LOOKS AT PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 20 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT LOOKS AT PRIVACY AND SECURITY], where an expert
in the computer security field is quoted as saying that "in practically all cases, the off-
the-shelf computers and control programs supplied by the manufacturers have inadequate
protection mechanisms for providing controlled access to a computer's assets." Two of
the most intensive current efforts, IBM's research project and the RISOS program,
were started within the past two or three years. See Thomas & Courtney, A Systematic
Approach to Data Security, in APPROACHES TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY in COMPUTER
SYSTEMS 26 (U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards 1974)
[hereinafter cited as APPROACHES TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY]; Abbott, The Problem of
Protecting Data Privacy, 4 J. CLINICAL COMPUTING 66, 72 (1974).
325. Davis, A Technologist's View of Privacy and Security in Automated Informa-
tion Systems, 4 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & LAw 264, 278 (1975); cf. GOVERNMENT
LOOKS AT PRIVACY AND SECURITY 25 (analysis of the cost question remains "more emo-
tional than objective").
326. For example, an Air Force, study has concluded that removing all of the
known security deficiencies in a contemporary computer system would cost about two
and a half million dollars, and one of the leading researchers on security has estimated
that it requires about 18 man-months of work simply to do a "good integrity study" for
the purpose of identifiying major security problems. GOVERNMENT LOOKS AT PRIVACY
AND SECURITY 26. It seems to be generally accepted that security costs will be higher
if it is necessary to remedy security defects in a previously designed system, rather than
building in technical safeguards from the outset. Correcting security flaws in computer
programs after a system is in operation may cost as much as ten times what it costs an
intruder to "break" the system. GOVERNMENT LOOKS AT PRIVACY AND SECURITY 26; cf.
Lipner, Security Considerations in Information System Design, in APPROACHES TO
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 55, 56.
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2) Controlled access to assure that the user of the system is who he
says he is, and can obtain access only to data and programs that he
is authorized to use; and
3) Integrity of the system-that is, it performs in accord with specifi-
cations, fails within narrow bounds and has appropriate checks on
the accuracy of data.327
Achieving these goals involves the interaction of many techniques, in-
cluding both equipment (computer hardware and software, communi-
cations and encrypting technology, specially designed buildings, burglar
alarms, and the like) and behavioral controls (legal prescriptions, ad-
ministrative regulations and sanctioning procedures, hiring and man-
agement practices, ethical codes, education).328 Different mixes of these
control technologies within a given system create different cost trade-
offs, including the cost of diminished utility of the system that typically
results from increased security.3 29 A logical and systematic cost analysis
for security purposes would require identification of individuals and
groups that may be motivated to "break" the system, measurement of
the "payoff" that they could obtain through penetration, and assessment
of the difficulty or cost they would experience in trying to gain ac-
cess.330 In the medical records field, as in most others, this kind of in-
formation generally will not be available, and even if it were this in-
tricate cost-benefit analysis hardly seems to be the kind of inquiry that
courts are well-equipped to handle. If the civil remedies approach is
to work in a nebulous, highly technical area like data security, the issues
must be simplified (and probably over-simplified) through further ad-
ministrative rulemaking,3 1 or through an analysis which focuses only
on the most obvious and easily implemented technical security meas-
ures.
332
327, Cf. GOVERNMENT LOOKS AT PRIVACY AND SECURITY.
328. See generally Miller, supra note 174, at 1207-21; APPROACHES TO PRIVACY
AND SECURITY; GOVERNMENT LOOKS AT PRIVACY AND SECURITY.
329. Cf. MEDICAL PRIVACY AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, supra note 7, at 85:
"[jT]he attainment of total confidentiality would result in infinite cost for zero utility."
330. Id. at 86 (letter from Dr. Alvin A. Bicker, Director of Information and Com-
puter Services, State University of New York at Stony Brook).
331. The OMB Guidelines at 28966 state:
Until such [general] standards [for system security] are developed and promul-
gated, agencies will be required to analyze each system as to risk of improper
disclosure of records and the cost and availability of measures to minimize those
risks. The Department of Commerce (National Bureau of Standards) will be
issuing guidelines and standards to assist agencies in evaluating various techno-
logical approaches to providing security safeguards in their system and for
assessing risks.
332. See, e.g., Thomas & Courtney, A Systematic Approach to Data Security, in
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The cost questions arising from the technical security requirement
raise the broader issue of whether ambitious privacy legislation like the
Privacy Act of 1974 is socially justifiable. Even the relatively limited
safeguards of the Privacy Act will probably cost several hundred million
dollars a year to implement, 333 and neither the Act nor the legislative
history provides a very clear statement of the values that will be real-
ized from this expenditure. Since the legal system has generally not
treated personal information as the property of the data subject and
allowed a true market system to develop,334 protection of privacy is
usually justified on non-economic grounds. In discussions of medical
privacy, the rationales for protection seem to fall into three broad cate-
gories: the utilitarian concern that the quality of medical care would
decline if confidentiality between doctor and patient could not be as-
sured; the belief that individuals would be subjected to psychological
and social harm if they could not keep intimate facts private; and the
APPROACHES TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY 26, where threats to data integrity are listed in
the following order of decreasing probability:
1) Errors and omissions;
2) Dishonest employees, mostly using data for improper purposes or system
functions ,that they are authorized to use in their routine duties;
3) Fire;
4) Disgruntled employees sabotaging the system;
5) Water; and
6) "Others'"-including strangers trying to penetrate the system.
See also WESTIN & BAKER at 306, where it is noted that all intrusion cases which the
authors were able to document involved an "insider" who already had access to the
system.
333. Commenting on an earlier draft of the bill, the Office of Management and
Budget estimated that the costs of implementation "will be on the order of $200 to $300
million per year over the next four to five years, with an additional one-time start-up
cost of about $100 million, which would be expended within the first two years." H.R.
REP. No. 1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1974).
334. See, e.g., Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (hospital
records the property of the hospital rather than the patient). It has been argued that
there is no theoretical reason why privacy could not be valued by a market system in
which the data subjects essentially licensed data users to have access to personal informa-
tion, analogously to a copyright proprietor licensing various uses of a book or song. Gold-
stein, Information Systems and the Role of Law: Some Prospects, 25 STAN. L. REV. 449,
473-75 (1973). Efforts to find "surrogate" market values for personal privacy by exam-
ining market transactions which are thought to have a privacy component appear to be
primitive at best. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT LooKs AT PRIVACY AND SECURITY 24, which
states:
[A]pproximately 15% of the telephones in the U.S. have unlisted numbers for
which the subscribers pay various rates varying from a $9.00 fixed charge to
$.50/month. On a less discretionary basis, passengers on national airlines have
been paying a surcharge on fares for airport security and anti-hijacking meas-
ures. Other widely used services which have a cost component for privacy or
security include: recreation, housing, health, education, and local (commuting)
travel. From these broad-based examples, it is possible to conclude that the
costs for maintaining personal data confidentiality and security in government-
operated information systems will be readily borne by the public.
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fear that control over sensitive personal data presents a threat to polit-
ical autonomy and personal freedom.
The most commonly given justification for medical privacy, the
utilitarian claim that patients will keep important information secret
from their doctors or forego needed medical treatment if they do not
have assurances of confidentiality33 5-is also the least substantial. For
years, evidence scholars have pointed out that nobody has ever been
able to demonstrate significant variations in health or health care utili-
zation among states depending upon the existence vel non of a doctor-
patient privilege. 338 In any event, apart from extraordinarily stigmatiz-
ing diseases like alcoholism or venereal disease, or the unique problems
of mental illness,3 37 it seems highly unlikely that substantial numbers
of people would forego needed medical treatment out of concern for
their privacy.
The second major theme of medical privacy justification, the need
to protect the individual's emotional tranquility and relations in the
community, has been articulated in various ways, ranging from the as-
sertion in the Hippocratic Oath that patient confidences are "shameful
to be spoken about"33 to more modern theories of the role of intimacy
in personality development:
Present-day spokesmen for the right of privacy frequently employ the
imagery of concentric circles or spheres. In the center is the "core
335. E.g., Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REv. 943,
945 (1959), where the author states:
The duty of professional secrecy is not based merely on an altruistic idea
of "sacredness of the relationship"; nor is it based solely on interests of com-
mon decency in protecting the patient's reputation or his peace of mind, al-
though these factors are both important underlying reasons for keeping confi-
dential information secret. The principal reason is that without some assurance
that information given to the doctor will be kept in confidence, a patient might
be reluctant to reveal embarrassing facts which could be vital to proper
diagnosis or treatment. And so the physician has a very serious obligation, both
to his patient and to his profession, to keep all the information he acquires dur-
ing the course of his professional relationships absolutely secret.
336. See, e.g., Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed
by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 609 (1943).
337. Freedman, Implementation of Assured Confidentiality for Clinical Informa-
tion, 4 J. CLINICAL COMPUTING 84, 85 (1974): "Some psychoanalytic colleagues of mine
who practiced in Germany during the 30's, recounted to me ... that after 1933, it was
quite impossible to practice psychiatry, in the way it had been done before, because the
very oppressiveness and awareness of the possibility of others gaining access to such
information completely blocked therapy."
338. The oath is quoted as follows in Note, Legal Protections of the Confidential
Nature of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 52 COLUas. L. Rav. 383 (1952): "What I
may see or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard
to the life of man, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself
holding such things shameful to be spoken about."
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self," which shelters the individual's "ultimate secrets"-"those hopes,
fears, and prayers that are beyond sharing with anyone unless the
individual comes under such stress that he must pour out these ulti-
mate secrets to secure emotional release." According to this image,
the next largest circle contains intimate secrets which can be shared
with close relatives or confessors of various kinds. Successively larger
circles are open to intimate friends, to casual acquaintances, and
finally to all observers.
...The patient, in distress, shares with the physician detailed
information concerning problems of body or mind. To employ the
imagery of concentric circles, the patient admits the physician to an
inner circle. If the physician, in turn, were to make public the in-
formation imparted by the patient-that is, if he were to invite scores
or thousands of other persons into the same inner circle-we would
be justified in charging that he had violated the patient's right of
privacy and that he had shown disrespect to him as a human being.889
This rationale seems more persuasive, at least if one assumes that the
model of personality development in which it is based is a desirable
one, and also one that it is not simply an ephemeral artifact of a par-
ticular historic period or narrow social class.8 40 However, desire to pro-
tect the individual personality does not seem to account for many of
the concerns evident in recent legislative proposals like the Privacy Act.
If the harm to personality was thought to lie in the act of being forced
to give up the intimate data unwillingly, regardless of the use to be
made of it, one would expect to see more emphasis on limiting or pre-
339. Walters, Ethical Aspects of Medical Confidentiality, 4 J. CLINICAL COMPUTING
9, 12-13 (1974). See aso Lavere, Privacy and Human Person, 4 J. CLINICAL COM-
PUTING 31, 32 (1974) (emphasis in original):
Why are we ... so chary about self-revelation in any form: ... [The answer is
simply that we are human persons, whose very existential integrity as conscious,
and especially as self-conscious, beings requires privacy, the unique, inner, al-
most impenetrable world which is the immediate and sustaining environment
of the self. From this mysterious center emanates all that we do in self-conscious
commitment to what we are.
But we are selective in what we say and do publically [sic], lest we re-
veal to an incomprehending and unappreciative world the inestimable inner
richness of our subjective being, our very being, only to have this revelation
ignored or ridiculed. This is why we are private and concerned about privacy.
340. Cf. Miller, Privacy in the Modern Corporate State: A Speculative Essay, 25
AD. L. Rnv. 231 (1973):
I am inclined to believe, although admittedly the conclusion is reached in-
tuitively rather than by hard evidence, that privacy is a value-a preference,
if you will-mainly of the middle-class and upper middle-class-of, that is,
the social group roughly labeled as the "elite" or the "establishment." . . .
Personal privacy, thus, is like freedom: Both are 18th- and 19th-century
values of diminishing significance in the modern age-if, indeed, they ever




venting the collection of data. If, on the other hand, the threat to per-
sonality is perceived as risk of disclosure to "significant others"-a fear
that sensitive information will leak back to family, friends or colleagues
who have been admitted to varying degrees of intimacy-then there
ought to be little concern with what large, impersonal organizations
may do with the information, so long as they are careful to keep it away
from the data subject's circles of acquaintance and kinship. Some of the
provisions of the Privacy Act do seem to be premised on one or the
other of these rationales, but others-the right to find out if an agency
has records affecting you, the ability to make corrections or file state-
ments of disagreement, and assurances that the data concerning you is
accurate, timely and complete-have only slight relevance to psycho-
logical development and intimacy with acquaintances. Nor do these
provisions seem to serve the third major rationale of privacy, the po-
litical concern that the power of the state be limited by shielding areas
of social and political life from official scrutiny.341 Indeed, it seems
anomalous to refer to these provisions as "privacy safeguards" in any
traditional sense; if the basic nature of privacy is a "right to be left
alone," these procedures embody a right not to be left alone, derived
from due process concepts of notice and a right to be heard in deci-
sions that affect basic personal interests. Thus, the access-and-correction
procedures are tools which the individual may use to resist the manipu-
lative efforts of public and private bureaucracies, whether in health
care or elsewhere. In this respect they can be viewed as sharing a com-
mon objective with the more conventional "privacy" controls on collec-
tion, storage and disclosure of personal information: redressing the bal-
ance of power between the individual and the large, impersonal organi-
zations that dominate society. If the outcome seems dubious,342 the effort
is at least worth making.
341. See, e.g., A. MILLER, Tua ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 38-46 (1971); WEsTiN &
BAKER at 14-20; Goldstein, supra note 334, at 472, quoting a paper by Prof. Westin en-
titled "Civil Liberties and Computerized Data Systems."
342. For a pessimistic appraisal, see Miller, supra note 310. Another factor militat-
ing against participation and control by the data subject is the cost of implementing
access-and-correction rights for data subjects, which seem certain to be much higher than
the costs for controls not involving such participation. See, e.g., Report, supra note 311,
at 11-9, which reads:
[P]reparation costs (creation, editing, reviewing, and preparing for "publication")
are likely, if anything, to be higher than they are today. These are people-de-
pendent service functions which show a steady trend toward greater and
greater cost. In addition, the kinds of people needed for these functions are
scarce and, naturally, reluctant to devote themselves to such tedious tasks.
As more and more expansion of knowledge services takes place, the diffi-
culty and cost of information preparation will get worse. These pressures may
make unlikely the re-doing of a bad knowledge bank ....
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